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In April 2006, the state of Massachusetts passed legislation aimed at achieving near universal health
insurance coverage. A key provision of this legislation, and of the national legislation passed in March
2010, is an individual mandate to obtain health insurance. Although previous researchers have studied
the impact of expansions in health insurance coverage among the indigent, children, and the elderly,
the Massachusetts reform gives us a novel opportunity to examine the impact of expansion to near-universal
health insurance coverage among the entire state population. In this paper, we are the first to use hospital
data to examine the impact of this legislation on insurance coverage, utilization patterns, and patient
outcomes in Massachusetts. We use a difference-in-difference strategy that compares outcomes in
Massachusetts after the reform to outcomes in Massachusetts before the reform and to outcomes in
other states. We embed this strategy in an instrumental variable framework to examine the effect of
insurance coverage on utilization patterns. Using the Current Population Survey, we find that the reform
increased insurance coverage among the general Massachusetts population. Our main source of data
is a nationally-representative sample of approximately 20% of hospitals in the United States. Among
the population of hospital discharges in Massachusetts, the reform decreased uninsurance by 36%
relative to its initial level. We also find that the reform affected utilization patterns by decreasing length
of stay and the number of inpatient admissions originating from the emergency room. Using new measures
of preventive care, we find some evidence that hospitalizations for preventable conditions were reduced.
The reform affected nearly all age, gender, income, and race categories. We also examine costs on
the hospital level and find that hospital cost growth did not increase after the reform in Massachusetts
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In April 2006, the state of Massachusetts passed legislation aimed at achieving near-universal health
insurance coverage. This legislation has been considered by many to be a model for the national
health reform legislation passed in March 2010. In light of both reforms, it is of great policy
importance to understand the impact of a growth in coverage to near-universal levels, unprecedented
in the United States. In theory, insurance coverage could increase or decrease the intensity and
cost of health care, depending on the underlying demand for care and its impact on health care
delivery. Which eects dominate in practice is an empirical question.
Although previous researchers have studied the impact of expansions in health insurance cover-
age, these studies have focused on specic subpopulations { the indigent, children, and the elderly
(see e.g. Currie and Gruber (1996); Card et al. (2008); Finkelstein (2007)). The Massachusetts
reform gives us a novel opportunity to examine the impact of a policy that achieved near-universal
health insurance coverage among the entire state population. Furthermore, the magnitude of the
expansion in coverage after the Massachusetts reform is similar to the predicted magnitude of the
coverage expansion in the national reform. In this paper, we are the rst to use hospital data
to examine the impact of this legislation on insurance coverage, patient outcomes, and utilization
patterns in Massachusetts. We use a dierence-in-dierence strategy that compares Massachusetts
after the reform to Massachusetts before the reform and to other states.
The rst question we address is whether the Massachusetts reform resulted in reductions in
uninsurance. We consider overall changes in coverage as well as changes in the composition of
types of coverage among the entire state population and the population who were hospitalized. One
potential impact of expansions in publicly subsidized coverage is to crowd out private insurance
(Cutler and Gruber (1996)). The impact of the reform on the composition of coverage allows us to
consider crowd out in the population as a whole as well as among those in the inpatient setting.
After estimating changes in the presence and composition of coverage, we turn to the impact of
the reform on hospital and preventive care. We rst study the intensity of care provided. Because
health insurance lowers the price of health care services to consumers, a large-scale expansion in
coverage has the potential to increase demand for health care services, the intensity of treatment,
and cost. Potentially magnifying this eect are general equilibrium shifts in the way care is supplied
2due to the large magnitude of the expansion (Finkelstein (2007)). Countervailing this eect is the
monopsonistic role of insurance plans in setting prices and quantities for hospital services. To the
extent that health reform altered the negotiating position of insurers vis a vis hospitals, expansions
in coverage could actually reduce total demand, intensity of treatment, or costs. The existence of
insurance itself can also alter the provision of care in the hospital directly (e.g. substitution towards
services that are reimbursed). Achieving near-universal insurance could alter length of stay and
other measures of services intensity though physical limits on the number of beds in the hospital,
eorts to increase throughput in response to changes in protability, or changes in care provided
when physicians face a pool of patients with more homogeneous coverage (Glied and Zivin (2002)).
Given these competing hypotheses, expanded insurance coverage could raise or lower the intensity
of care provided.
In addition to changes in the production process within a hospital, we are interested in the
impact of insurance coverage on how patients enter the health care system and access preventive
care. We rst examine changes in the use of the emergency room (ER) as a point of entry for
inpatient care. Because hospitals must provide at least some care, without regard to insurance
status, the ER is a potentially important point of access to hospital care for the uninsured.1 When
the ER is the primary point of entry into the hospital, changes in admissions from the ER can impact
welfare for a variety of reasons. First, the cost of treating patients in the ER is likely higher than it
would be to treat the same patient in another setting. Second, the emergency room is designed to
treat acute health events. If the ER is a patient's primary point of care, then he might not receive
preventive care that could mitigate future severe and costly health events. Uninsured individuals
who access inpatient care after a visit to the emergency room also have barriers to receiving follow
up treatment (typically dispensed in an outpatient setting or as drug prescriptions); potentially
reducing the ecacy of the inpatient care they receive. To the extent that uninsurance led people
to use the ER as a point of entry for treatment that they otherwise would have sought through
another channel, we expect to see a decline in the number of inpatient admissions originating in
the ER.
We also study the impact of insurance on access to care outside of the inpatient setting. Using a
1Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), hospitals must provide stabilizing care
and examination to people who arrive in the ER for an emergency condition without considering whether a person is
insured or their ability to pay.
3methodology developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) we are able to
study preventive care in an outpatient setting using inpatient data. We identify inpatient admissions
that should not occur in the presence of sucient preventive care. If the reform facilitated increased
preventive care, then we expect a reduction in the number of inpatient admissions meeting these
criteria. These measures also indirectly measure health in the form of averted hospitalizations.
We augment this analysis with data on direct measures of access to and use of outpatient and
preventive care.
Finally, we turn to the impact of the reform on the cost of hospital care. We examine hospital-
level measures of operating costs (e.g. overhead, salaries, and equipment) that include both xed
and variable costs. This allows us to jointly measure direct eects of insurance on cost { the
relative eect of changing the out of pocket price { as well as the potential for quality competition
at the hospital level. In the latter case, hospitals facing consumers who are relatively less price
elastic (or more quality elastic) increase use of costly services and may also increase use of variable
inputs as well as investments in large capital projects in order to attract price-insensitive customers
(Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992)). In the extreme, large expansions in coverage might lead to
a so called \medical arms race," in which hospitals make investments in large capital projects to
attract customers and are subsequently able to increase demand to cover these xed costs (Robinson
and Luft (1987)).2 The impact of all of these eects would be increased hospital costs as coverage
approaches near-universal levels.
Our analysis relies on three main data sets. To examine the impact on coverage in Massachusetts
as a whole, we analyze data from the Current Population Survey. To examine coverage among the
hospitalized population, health care utilization, and preventive care, we analyze the universe of
hospital discharges from a nationally-representative sample of approximately 20% of hospitals in
the United States from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) National Inpatient
Sample (NIS). In addition, we augment our study of access and preventive care using data from
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).
In the next section, we describe the elements of the reform and its implementation, as well as
the limited existing research on its impact. In the third section, we describe the data. In the fourth
2The resulting equilibrium is akin to the socially excessive level of xed costs associated with free entry (Cutler
et al. (2010); Mankiw and Whinston (1986)) though information asymmetries and insurance can exacerbate these
problems.
4section, we present the dierence-in-dierence results for the impact of the reform on insurance
coverage and hospital and preventive care. In the fth section, we present the instrumental variable
results and examine heterogeneity in these results by patient demographic characteristics. In the
sixth section, we conclude and discuss our continuing work in this area.
2 Description of the Reform
The recent Massachusetts health insurance legislation, known as Chapter 58, included several fea-
tures, the most salient of which was a mandate for individuals to obtain health insurance coverage
or pay a tax penalty. All individuals were required to obtain coverage, with the exception of indi-
viduals with religious objections and individuals whose incomes were too high to qualify for state
health insurance subsidies but too low for health insurance to be\aordable"as determined by the
Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority. For a broad summary of the reform, see
McDonough et al. (2006); for details on the implementation of the reform see The Massachusetts
Health Insurance Connector Authority (2008).
The reform also extended free and subsidized health insurance to low income populations in
two forms: expansions in the existing Medicaid program (called \MassHealth" in Massachusetts),
and the launch of a new program called CommCare. First, as part of the Medicaid expansion, the
reform expanded Medicaid eligibility for children to 300% of poverty, and it restored benets to
special populations who had lost coverage during the 2002-2003 scal crisis, such as the long-term
unemployed and those enrolled in the HIV program. The reform also facilitated outreach eorts
to Medicaid eligible individuals and families. Implementation of the elements of the reform was
staggered, and Medicaid changes were among the rst to take eect. According to one source,
\Because enrollment caps were removed from one Medicaid program and income eligibility was
raised for two others, tens of thousands of the uninsured were newly enrolled just ten weeks after
the law was signed" (Kingsdale (2009), page w591).
Second, the reform extended free and subsidized coverage through a new program called Comm-
Care. CommCare oered free coverage to individuals up to 150% of poverty and three tiers of
subsidized coverage up to 300% of poverty. Some funding for the subsidies was nanced by the
5dissolution of existing state uncompensated care pools.3 To limit crowd-out of federal coverage,
individuals with coverage through CHAMPVA, the federal health insurance program for veterans,
or Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly, were not allowed to purchase
subsidized CommCare plans. CommCare plans were sold through a new state-run health insurance
exchange. For the rst three years, only four existing Medicaid managed care organizations were
allowed to oer plans through CommCare.
In addition, the reform created a new online health insurance marketplace called the Connector,
where individuals who did not qualify for free or subsidized coverage could purchase health insurance
coverage. Unsubsidized CommChoice plans available through the Connector from several health
insurers oered three regulated levels of coverage { bronze, silver, and gold. Young Adult plans
with fewer benets were also made available to individuals age 26 and younger. Individuals were
also free to continue purchasing health insurance through their employers or to purchase health
insurance directly from insurers.
The reform also implemented changes in the broader health insurance market. It merged the
individual and small group health insurance markets. Existing community rating regulations, which
required premiums to be set regardless of certain beneciary characteristics of age and gender,
remained in place, though it gave new authority to insurers to price policies based on smoking
status. It also required all family plans to cover young adults for at least two years beyond loss of
dependent status, up to age 26.
Another important aspect of the reform was an employer mandate that required employers
with more than 10 full time employees to oer health insurance to employees and contribute a
certain amount to premiums. The legislation allowed employers to designate the Connector as its
\employer-group health benet plan"for the purposes of federal law. Employer-sponsored coverage
through the exchange could combine employer contributions from multiple part-time employers or
from spousal employers.
The national health reform legislation passed in March 2010 shares many features of the Mas-
3Addressing costs associated with the reform remains an important policy issue. In 2008, facing a recession, the
Massachusetts legislature passed new legislation that scaled back subsidies for low-income legal immigrants. Current
policy debates in Massachusetts focus on cost-control { the recent\Special Commission on the Health Care Payment
System" proposed a system of \global payments," which would require Federal waivers for Medicaid and Medicare
(Bebinger (2009)). In April 2010, Governor Deval Patrick's administration used existing regulatory authority for the
rst time to deny premium increases in the individual / small group market. In August 2010, additional legislation
established open seasons in this market.
6sachusetts reform, including an individual mandate to obtain health insurance coverage, new re-
quirements for employers, expansions in subsidized care, state-level health insurance marketplaces
modeled on the Massachusetts Connector, and new requirements for insurers to cover dependents
to age 26, to name a few. For a summary of the national legislation, see Kaiser Family Foundation
(2010). Taken together, the main characteristics of the reform bear strong similarity to those in
the Massachusetts reform, and the impact of the Massachusetts reform should oer insight into the
likely impact of the national reform.
As Chapter 58 was enacted very recently, there has been very little research on its impact to date.
Long (2008) presents results on the preliminary impact of the reform from surveys administered in
2006 and 2007. Yelowitz and Cannon (2010) examine the impact of the reform on coverage using
data from the March 2006-2009 Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS). They also
examine changes in self-reported health status in an eort to capture the eect of the reform on
health. Using this measure of health, they nd little evidence of health eects. The NIS discharge
data allow us to examine utilization and health eects in much greater detail. Long et al. (2009)
perform an earlier analysis using one fewer year of the same data. Long et al. (2009) and Yelowitz
and Cannon (2010) nd a decline in uninsurance among the population age 18 to 64 of 6.6 and 6.7
percent respectively. We also rely on the CPS for preliminary analysis.4 Our main results, however,
focus on administrative data from hospitals.
3 Description of the Data
For our main analysis, we focus on a nationally-representative sample of hospital discharges. Hos-
pital discharge data oer several advantages over other forms of data to examine the impact of
Chapter 58. First, though hospital discharge data oer only limited information on the overall
population, they oer a great deal of information on a population of great policy interest { individ-
uals who are sick. This population constitutes the group most vulnerable to changes in coverage
due to illness itself and demographics correlated both with health and insurance coverage (i.e. race,
income, etc.). Furthermore, inpatient care represents a disproportionate fraction of total health
care costs. Second, hospital discharge data allow us to observe the insured as well as the uninsured,
4Our estimates using the CPS are similar in magnitude to the prior studies, though our sample diers in that we
include all individuals under age 65 and at all income levels.
7regardless of payer, and payer information is likely to be more accurate than it is in survey data.
Third, hospital discharge data allow us to examine treatment patterns and some health outcomes in
great detail. In addition, relative to the CPS, hospital discharge data allow us to examine changes
in medical expenditure, subject to limitations discussed below. One disadvantage of hospital dis-
charge data relative to the CPS is that the underlying sample of individuals in our data could have
changed as a result of the reform. We use many techniques to examine selection as an outcome of
the reform and to control for selection in the analysis of other outcomes.
Our data are from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Nationwide Inpatient
Sample (NIS). Each year of NIS data is a stratied sample of 20 percent of United States community
hospitals, designed to be nationally representative.5 The data contain the universe of all hospital
discharges, regardless of payer, for each hospital in the data in each year. Because such a large
fraction of hospitals are sampled in each year, and because of stratication, a large fraction of
hospitals appear in several years of the data, and we can use hospital identiers to examine changes
within hospitals over time.
We focus on the most recently available NIS data for the years 2004 to 2008. Our full sample
includes a total of 36,362,108 discharges for individuals of all ages. An advantage of these data
relative to the annual March Supplement to the CPS is that they allow us to examine the impact
of the reform quarterly instead of annually. Relative to the original version of this paper (Kolstad
and Kowalski (2010)), we extend our analysis by an additional 15 months after the reform using
data that recently became available. The reform was passed in April 2006, and our data now begin
at the start of 2004 and extend through the end of 2008.
Because some aspects of the reform, such as Medicaid expansions, were implemented imme-
diately after the reform, but other reforms were staggered, we do not want to include the period
immediately following the reform in the After or the Before period. To be conservative, we dene
the After reform period to include 2007 Q3 and later. The After period represents the time after
July 1, 2007, when one of the most salient features of the reform, the individual health insurance
5\Community hospitals"are dened by the American Hospital Association as\all non-Federal, short-term, general,
and other specialty hospitals, excluding hospital units of institutions" (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(2004 { 2007b)). The sample is stratied by geographic region { Northeast vs. Midwest vs. West vs. South; control
{ government vs. private not-for-prot vs. private investor-owned; location { urban vs. rural; teaching status {
teaching vs. non-teaching; and bed size { small vs. medium vs. large. Implicit stratication variables include state
and three-digit zip code.
8mandate, took eect. We denote the During period as the year from 2006 Q3 through 2007 Q2, and
we use this period to analyze the immediate impact of the reform before the individual mandate
took eect. The Before period includes 2004 Q1 through 2006 Q2.
Unfortunately, Massachusetts did not provide Q4 data to the NIS in 2006 or 2007.6 To address
this limitation, we drop all data from all states in 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4.7 We account for seasonal
trends by including a xed eect for each quarterly time period.
In total, from 2004-2008, the data cover 42 states { Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, Missis-
sippi, Montana, North Dakota, and New Mexico are not available in any year because they did not
provide data to the NIS. The data include the universe of discharges from a total of 3,090 unique
hospitals, with 48 in Massachusetts.8 The unit of observation in the data and in our main analysis
is the hospital discharge. To account for stratication, we use discharge weights in all summary
statistics and regressions. Although it would be interesting to examine the reform controlling for
individual xed eects, individual identiers are not available.
4 Dierence-in-Dierence Empirical Results
4.1 Impact on Uninsurance
4.1.1 Impact on Insurance Coverage in the Overall and Inpatient Hospital Popula-
tions
We begin by considering the issue that was the primary motivation for the Massachusetts reform
{ the expansion of health insurance coverage. Before focusing on inpatient hospitalizations, we
place this population in the context of the general population using data from the 2004 to 2009
March Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS). In most of our results, we focus on
the nonelderly population because the reform was geared toward the nonelderly population (elderly
with coverage through Medicare were explicitly excluded from purchasing subsidized CommCare
6Potential users of these data should note that to address this limitation, the NIS relabeled some data from the
rst three quarters of the year in 2006 and 2007 MA as Q4 data. Using information provided by NIS, we recovered
the unaltered data for use here.
7In Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we did not drop data from other states in 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4, but we do here
so that we can measure hospital xed eects equally well in Massachusetts and other states. This change accounts
for the very small discrepancy between the MA
During coecients in this paper and in the previous version.
8With few exceptions, if a hospital is in the data in a given year, it is in the data for all available quarters of that
year.
9plans, but they were eligible for Medicaid expansions if they met the income eligibility criteria).9
Figure 1 depicts trends in total insurance coverage of all types among nonelderly in the CPS.
The upper line shows trends in coverage in Massachusetts, and the lower line shows trends in
coverage in all other states. From the upper line, it is apparent that Massachusetts started with a
higher baseline level of coverage than the average among other states. The average level of coverage
among the nonelderly in Massachusetts prior to the reform (2004-2006 CPS) was 88.2%.10 This
increased to a mean coverage level of 93.8% in the 2008-2009 CPS.11 In contrast, the remainder
of the country had relative stable rates of nonelderly coverage: 82.7% pre-reform and 82.5% post-
reform. For the entire population, including those over 65, coverage in Massachusetts went from
89.5% to 94.5% for the same periods while the remainder of the country saw a small decline from
84.6% insured pre-reform to 84.4% insured post-reform.
The initial coverage level in Massachusetts was clearly higher than the national average, though
it was not a particular outlier. Using data from the 2004, 2005 and 2006 CPS, we rank states in
terms of insurance coverage. In this time period, Massachusetts had the seventh highest level of
coverage among the nonelderly in the US. It was one of 17 states with 88 percent or higher share
of the population insured, and its initial coverage rate was only 1.7 percentage points higher than
the 86.5 percent coverage rate in the median state.
Appendix Table 1 formalizes this comparison of means with dierence-in-dierence regression
results from the CPS. These results suggest that the Massachusetts reform was successful in expand-
ing health insurance coverage in the population. The estimated reduction in nonelderly uninsurance
9Because the reform was geared toward the nonelderly, we considered using the elderly as an additional control
group in our dierence-in-dierence estimates. However, we did not pursue this identication strategy for three
reasons: rst, the elderly were eligible for some elements of the reform; second, the elderly are less healthy overall
and suer from dierent types of health shocks than the younger individuals of interest to us; and third, we nd
some increases in coverage for the elderly. Although many assume that the elderly are universally covered through
Medicare, some estimates suggest that 4.5% or more of the elderly population are not eligible for full federally
subsidized coverage through Medicare Part A, so coverage increases are possible in this population (Birnbaum and
Patchias (n.d.), Gray et al. (2006)).
10We follow the Census Bureau in dening types of coverage and uninsurance. These denitions and the associated
code to implement them are available from http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthinsvar.html. For indi-
viduals who report having both Medicaid and Medicare (\dual eligibles") we code Medicaid as their primary insurance
type. We make the additional assumption that individuals who are covered by private health insurance but not by
an employer-sponsored plan are in the private market unrelated to employment.
11Results from 2007 are dicult to interpret because the reform was in the midst of being implemented in March,
when the CPS survey was taken. Medicaid expansions had occurred at that point but the individual mandate was
not implemented until July 2007. We thus focus on the period that was clearly before the full reform { CPS March
supplement answers from 2004-2006 { compared to 2008-2009. Note that we use more precise denitions of the periods
before, during, and after the reform in the NIS, as described below. We have made these denitions as comparable
as possible across all data sets.
10of 5.7 percentage points represents a 48% reduction relative to the pre-reform rate of nonelderly
uninsurance in Massachusetts. In Appendix Tables 2-4 we present estimates of the decline in unin-
surance for each age, gender, income, and race category using the CPS. We discuss these results
when we consider the incidence of the reform.
To some, the decrease in uninsurance experienced by Massachusetts may appear small. To put
this in perspective, the national reform targets a reduction in uninsurance of a similar magnitude.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Oce of the Actuary, National Health Statistics
Group, predicts a decrease in uninsurance of 7.1 percentage points nationally from 2009 to 2019
(Truer et al. (2010)).
4.1.2 Regression Results on the Impact on Uninsurance
Using the NIS data, we begin by estimating a simple dierence-in-dierence specication. Our
primary estimating equation is:








dht + dht (1)
where Y is an outcome variable for hospital discharge d in hospital h at time t. The coecient
of interest, , gives the impact of the reform { the change in coverage after the reform relative
to before the reform in Massachusetts relative to other states. Analogously,  gives the change in
coverage during the reform relative to before the reform in Massachusetts relative to other states.
The identication assumption is that there were no factors outside of the reform that dierentially
aected Massachusetts relative to other states after the reform. We also include hospital and
quarterly time xed eects. Thus, identication comes from comparing hospitals to themselves over
time in Massachusetts compared to other states, after exibly allowing for seasonality and trends
over time. We include hospital xed eects to account for the fact that the NIS is an unbalanced
panel of hospitals. Without hospital xed eects, we are concerned that change in outcomes could
be driven by changes in the sample of hospitals in either Massachusetts or control states (primarily
the prior since the sample is nationally representative but is not necessarily representative within
11each state) after the reform.12 Our preferred specication, which includes time and hospital xed
eects, is the most conservative model in our view.13
For each outcome variable of interest we also estimate models that incorporate a vector X of
patient demographics and other risk adjustment variables. We do not control for these variables
in our main specications because we are interested in measuring the impact of the reform as
broadly as possible. To the extent that the reform changed the composition of the sample of
inpatient discharges based on these observable characteristics, we would obscure this eect by
controlling for observable patient characteristics. Beyond our main specications, the impact of the
reform on outcomes holding the patient population xed is also highly relevant. For this reason,
in other specications, we incorporate state-of-the-art risk adjusters, and we present a number of
specications focused on understanding changes in the patient composition. We return to this in
more detail below. In general, however, we nd that though there is some evidence of selection, it is
not large enough to alter the robustness of our ndings with respect to coverage or most outcomes.
We use linear probability models for all of our binary outcomes. Because our specications
are nearly saturated in the independent variables, our coecients are very similar to unreported
average marginal eects from probit models.14 Under each coecient, we report asymptotic 95%
condence intervals, clustered to allow for arbitrary correlations between observations within a
state. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), we also report 95% condence intervals obtained by block
bootstrap by state.15
In addition to the specications we present here, we consider a number of robustness checks to
investigate the internal and external validity of our results. We nd that the conclusions presented
in Table 1 are robust to a variety of alternative control groups and do not appear to be driven
by unobserved factors that are a unique to Massachusetts. For brevity, we present and discuss
12Restricting the sample to the balanced panel of the 52 hospitals that are in the sample in all possible quarters
(2004 Q1 to 2008 Q4, excluding 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4) eliminates approximately 98% of hospitals and 97% of
discharges, likely making the sample less representative, so we do not make this restriction in our main specications.
However, in the last panel of Appendix Table 7, we present our main specications using only the balanced panel,
and the results are not statistically dierent from the main results.
13It is possible that insurance coverage changes which hospital people visit, in which case the bias from the use of
hospital xed eects would be of ambiguous sign. However, we are not able to investigate this claim since we do not
have longitudinal patient identiers. Absent dierential selection into specic hospitals based on insurance status, we
believe that the model with hospital xed eects is the most conservative.
14This is consistent with a general phenomenon. See Angrist and Pischke (2009).
15See Appendix A for more detail on the implementation of the block bootstrapped condence intervals. In practice,
the condence intervals obtained through both methods are very similar. To conserve space, we do not report the
block bootstrapped standard errors in some tables.
12these results in Appendix B. In Figures 2 and 3, we present quarterly trends for each of our
outcome variables of interest for Massachusetts and the remainder of the country. Each line and the
associated condence interval are the coecient estimates for each quarter for Massachusetts and
non-Massachusetts states in a regression that includes hospital xed eects. The omitted category
for each is the rst quarter of 2004, which we set equal to 0.16 Given our short time period, we
are particularly concerned about pre-trends in Massachusetts relative to controls. While the plots
show slight variation, none of our outcomes of interest appear to have strong pre-reform trends in
Massachusetts relative to control states that might explain our ndings. When we formalize this
visual analysis in results not reported, we nd slightly dierent trends in Massachusetts, some with
statistical signicance. However, the magnitude of these eects is generally small relative to the
MAAfter coecients for each outcome. Taken together, this evidence suggests that our estimates
are unlikely to be driven by dierential pre-reform trends in Massachusetts.
4.1.3 Eects on the Composition of Insurance Coverage among Hospital Discharges
In this section, we investigate the eect of the Massachusetts reform on the level and composition of
health insurance coverage in the sample of hospital discharges. We divide health insurance coverage
(or lack thereof) into ve mutually exclusive types { Uninsured, Medicaid, Private, Medicare,
and Other. CommCare plans and other government plans such as Workers' Compensation and
CHAMPUS (but not Medicaid and Medicare) are included in Other. We estimate equation (1)
separately for each coverage type and report the results in columns 1 through 5 of Table 1. Because
these represent mutually exclusive types of coverage, the coecients sum to zero across the rst
ve columns. We focus on results for the nonelderly here, and we report results for the full sample
and for the elderly only in Table 6.
Column 1 presents the estimated eect of the reform on the overall level of uninsurance. We nd
that the reform led to a 2.31 percentage point reduction in uninsurance. Both sets of condence
intervals show that the dierence-in-dierence impact of the reform on uninsurance is statistically
signicant at the 1% level. Since the model with xed eects obscures the main eects of MA and
After, we also report mean coverage rates in Massachusetts and other states before and after the
16This normalization obscures initial level dierences in Massachusetts and other states that could alter the visual
comparison of trends.
13reform. The estimated impact of Chapter 58 represents an economically signicant reduction in
uninsured discharges of roughly 36% (2.31/6.43) of the Massachusetts pre-reform mean. We present
coecients on selected covariates from this regression in column 1 of Appendix Table 5.
We see from the dierence-in-dierence results in column 2 of Table 1 that among the nonelderly
hospitalized population, the expansion in Medicaid coverage was larger than the overall reduction in
uninsurance. Medicaid coverage expanded by 3.89 percentage points, and uninsurance decreased by
2.31 percentage points. Consistent with the timing of the initial Medicaid expansion, the coecient
on MADuring suggests that a large fraction of impact of the Medicaid expansion was realized in
the year immediately following the passage of the legislation. It appears that at least some of
the Medicaid expansion crowded out private coverage in the hospital, which decreased by 3.06
percentage points. The risk-adjusted coecient in the last row of column 2 suggests that even after
controlling for selection into the hospital, our nding of crowd out persists. All of these eects are
statistically signicant at the 1% level.
To further understand crowd out and the incidence of the reform on the hospitalized popula-
tion relative to the general population, we compare the estimates from Table 1 { coverage among
those who were hospitalized { with results from the CPS { coverage in the overall population.
In Appendix Table 1, we report dierence-in-dierence results by coverage type in the CPS. The
coverage categories reported by the CPS do not map exactly to those used by the NIS. In the CPS,
insurance that is coded as private coverage in the NIS is divided into employer sponsored coverage
and private coverage not related to employment. Furthermore, to deal with the new types of plans
available in Massachusetts, CommCare and CommChoice, the Census Bureau decided to code all of
these plans as\Medicaid."17 Thus the estimated impact on Medicaid is actually the combined eect
of expansions in traditional Medicaid with increases in CommCare and CommChoice.18 Medicaid
expansions are larger among the hospital discharge population than they are in the CPS { a 3.89
percentage point increase vs. a 3.50 percentage point increase, respectively. Furthermore, the CPS
17We thank the Census Bureau sta for their rapid and thorough response to the many calls we made to conrm
this decision on categorizing the new types of plans.
18Since the CPS coded CommChoice plans as Medicaid, we are concerned that estimated increases in Medicaid
coverage in the CPS should could lead to overestimates of crowd out because the estimated Medicaid expansion could
include includes individuals who transitioned from private market unsubsidized care to CommChoice unsubsidized
care. To investigate this possibility, in unreported regressions, we divide the sample by income to exclude individuals
who are not eligible for subsidized care. The results suggest an increase in \Medicaid" coverage for people above
300% of the FPL of 0.6 percentage points. Thus, the bulk of the eect on Medicaid reects some form of publicly
subsidized coverage and not unsubsidized CommChoice plans coded as Medicaid.
14coecient is statistically lower than the NIS coecient. It is not surprising to see larger gains in
coverage in the hospital because hospitals often retroactively cover Medicaid-eligible individuals
who had not signed up for coverage. Furthermore, the hospitalized population disproportionately
represents poor individuals, and these individuals could have multiple discharges.19
Comparing changes in types of coverage in the NIS to changes in types of coverage in the
CPS, we nd that crowd out of private coverage only occurred among the hospitalized popula-
tion. In Appendix Table 1, the magnitudes of the MAAfter coecients are 0.0345 and 0.0351 for
ESHI and Medicaid respectively. That is, both employer-sponsored and Medicaid, CommCare or
CommChoice coverage increased by a similar amount following the reform, and those increases were
roughly equivalent to the total decline in uninsurance (5.7 percentage points). The only crowding
out in Appendix Table 1 seems to be of non-group private insurance, though this eect is relatively
small at 0.86 percentage points. Combining coecients for ESHI and private insurance unrelated
to employment gives us a predicted increase in private coverage (as it is coded in the NIS) of 2.59
percentage points. This is in marked contrast with the 3.54 percentage point decrease in private
coverage that we observe in the NIS.
Returning to the NIS, we consider changes in coverage beyond private and Medicaid. Our results
also indicate a statistically signicant change in the number of non-elderly covered by Medicare. The
magnitude of the eect, however, is quite small both in level of coverage and in change relative to the
baseline share of non-elderly inpatient admissions covered by Medicare. Other coverage, the general
category that includes other types of government coverage including CommCare, increased by a
statistically signicant 1.06 percentage points. We restrict the dependent variable to include only
CommCare in specication 6. By denition, CommCare coverage is zero outside of Massachusetts
and before the reform. CommCare increased by 1.24 percentage points. The coecient is larger than
the overall increase in Other coverage, though the dierence in the coecients is not statistically
signicant.20 As reported in specication 7, the probability of having missing coverage information
19As shown in Table 7, people from the poorest 25% of zip codes account for 28% of hospital discharges. Another
factor that aects the comparison between CPS Medicaid changes and NIS Medicaid changes is that CPS Medicaid
changes should overstate changes in Medicaid eligibility because they also include increases in take up that occurred
to comply with the mandate. In contrast, Medicaid changes in the NIS should only reect changes in eligibility
because hospitals, in order to maximize reimbursement, facilitate take-up for Medicaid-eligibles before and after the
reform. That said, changes in Medicaid take-up reected in the CPS could have real eects on utilization if the reform
encouraged previously eligible individuals to take up Medicaid, potentially making them more likely to consume care,
instead of retroactively taking up Medicaid after a hospitalization.
20We would have liked to have used Massachusetts residents that were prohibited from obtaining coverage through
15also increased after the reform, but this increase was small relative to the observed increases in
coverage.
4.2 Impacts on Health Care Provision
Having established the impact of the Massachusetts reform on coverage, we next turn to our primary
focus: understanding the impact of achieving near-universal health insurance coverage on health
care delivery and cost. To do so, we estimate equation (1) with a set of dependent variables that
capture changes in the way in which health care is delivered and consumed. This section is divided
into four subsections, each intended to address key areas of health care delivery that might be
aected by health insurance coverage. In our next section, 4.2.1, we consider the impact of health
insurance expansion on the extensive margin decision to seek care. In section 4.2.2, we study
changes in the intensive margin choice of intensity of services provided, conditional on admission
to the hospital. In the third subsection, we study the impact of health insurance coverage on
outpatient and preventive care. Finally, we turn to studying the impact of the Massachusetts
reform on hospital costs.
The relevant results for this section are contained in Tables 1 through 5. Tables 1, 3, and 4 report
results on the discharge level, following directly from equation (1). Tables 2 and 5, on the other
hand, report results on the hospital-time period level. Table 2 presents results that are aggregated
to the hospital-quarter level because we need to aggregate individual discharges to examine total
discharges. Table 5 presents hospital cost results on the hospital-year level. Our cost measures,
which we describe in more detail below, are based on data collected on an annual basis, allowing
us only to identify the model from changes from year to year within a hospital.
4.2.1 Impact on Hospital Volume and Patient Composition
One potential impact of the reform could be to increase the use of inpatient hospital services.
Whether more people accessed health insurance after the reform is of intrinsic interest as this
implies a change in welfare due to the policy (e.g. an increase in moral hazard through insurance
CommCare because of eligibility for federal coverage as a control group, but the Massachusetts data in the NIS do not
include enough detail (e.g. eligibility for coverage through CHAMPUS) for us to do so. Furthermore, the individual
mandate could still have had an impact on those prohibited from obtaining coverage through CommCare, for example
if it encouraged enrollment of people previously eligible but not enrolled in CHAMPUS.
16or a decrease in ex ante barriers to the hospital through insurance). Beyond this, changes in the
composition of patients present an important empirical hurdle to estimating the causal impact of
the reform on subsequent measures of care delivered. If the number of patients seeking care after
the reform increased and the marginal patients diered in underlying health status, changes in
treatment intensity could reect this, rather than actual changes in the way care is delivered. We
investigate this possibility in two ways: rst, we examine changes in the number of discharges at
the hospital level; second, we control for observable changes in the health of the patient pool and
compare our results to specications without controls.
In Table 2, we investigate selection into hospitals by estimating a series of specications with
the number of discharges at the hospital-quarter level as the dependent variable. In column 1
of Table 2, which includes hospital and quarterly xed eects to mitigate the impact of changes
in sample composition, the coecient on MAAfter in column 1 indicates that the number of
quarterly discharges for hospitals in Massachusetts was unchanged relative to other states following
the reform. The coecient estimate of 19 is small relative to the pre-reform quarterly discharge
level of 5,616, and it is not statistically signicant. In column 2, we re-estimate the model with the
log of total discharges as the dependent variable to account for any skewness in hospital size. The
coecient on MAAfter in this specication also indicates that the reform had no impact on the
total volume of discharges. Columns 3 to 6 break down changes in discharges by age relative to
65. Among these subgroups we nd no statistically signicant change in total elderly or nonelderly
discharges in either levels or logs. These ndings suggest that any change in the composition
of patients would have to have occurred through substitution as the total number of discharges
remained unchanged.
To deal with changes in the patient population directly, we control for observable changes in the
health of the patient pool using six sets of risk adjustment variables: demographic characteristics,
the number of diagnoses on the discharge record, individual components of the Charlson Score
measure of comorbidities, AHRQ comorbidity measures, All-Patient Rened (APR)-DRGs, and
All-Payer Severity-adjusted (APS)-DRGs. We discuss these measures in depth in Appendix C.
These measures are a valid means to control for selection if and only if unobservable changes in
health are correlated with the changes in health that we observe. We interpret our risk-adjusted
specications assuming that this untestable condition holds, with the caveat that if it does not
17hold, we cannot interpret our results without a model of selection.
In specications 8 to 13 of Table 2 we estimate our model with a subset of our measures of
patient severity as the dependent variable. For this exercise, we focus on the six sets of severity
measures that are simplest to specify as outcome variables. This allows us to observe some direct
changes in the population severity in Massachusetts after the reform. These results present a mixed
picture of the underlying patient severity. For four of the six measures, we nd no signicant change
in severity. Two of the severity measures, however, saw statistically signicant changes after the
reform. The results in specication 8 suggest that the average severity, measured by the Charlson
score, increased following the reform. The model of APS-DRG charge weights suggests the opposite.
Taken together, these results and the lack of any change in total discharges are not indicative of
a consistent pattern of changes in the patient population within a given hospital in Massachusetts
after the reform relative to before relative to other states.
Despite this general picture, and in light of the results in columns 8 and 13, for all of our
outcome variables we estimate the same model incorporating the vector of covariates X, which
exibly controls for all risk adjusters simultaneously. In general, our results are unchanged by
the inclusion of these controls { consistent with the small estimated impact of the reform on the
individual severity measures. If anything, we nd that the main results are strengthened by the
inclusion of covariates as we would expect with increased severity after the reform.
In column 7 of Table 2, we investigate the possibility that either hospital size increased or
sampling variation led to an observed larger size of hospitals after the reform relative to before
the reform by using a separate measure of inherent hospital size as the dependent variable. In this
measure, Hospital Bedsize, as collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey
of hospitals, hospitals were categorized in small, medium, or large using categories for the number
of hospital beds that did not change during the sample period. We recode the data so that small
hospitals have a value of zero, medium hospitals have a value of 0.5, and large hospitals have a value
of one. The coecient estimates from the reported regression, which includes hospital and quarter
xed eects, indicates that hospital size increased by 2.5 percent of the possible range from 0 to 1.
This estimate, which is statistically signicant, indicates that the hospitals that identify impacts on
length of stay increased in size, perhaps to accommodate the increases in insurance coverage, even
though we observe no statistically signicant change in total discharges. The discrepancy between
18the dierence-in-dierence mean estimate of 8 percent from the means at the bottom of the table
and the dierence-in-dierence regression estimate of 2.5 percent estimates suggests that larger
hospitals are dierentially selected into the sample after the reform in Massachusetts, meriting our
use of hospital xed eects in our preferred specication.
4.2.2 Impact on Resource Utilization and Length of Stay
Moving beyond the question of the extensive margin decision to go to the hospital or to admit a
patient to the hospital, we turn to the intensity of services provided conditional on receiving care.
The most direct measure of this is the impact of the reform on length of stay. As discussed earlier,
we expect length of stay to increase in response to increased coverage if newly insured individuals
(or their physician agents) demand more treatment { that is, if moral hazard or income eects
dominate. Alternately, we expect length of stay to decrease in response to increased coverage if
newly insured individuals are covered by insurers who are better able to impact care through either
quantity restrictions or prices { that is, if insurer bargaining eects dominate. Length of stay
may also decline if insurance alters treatment decisions, potentially allowing substitution between
inpatient and outpatient care or drugs that would not have been feasible without coverage. To
investigate these two eects, we estimate models of length of stay following equation (1) with both
levels and logs of the dependent variable.
The results in specications 8 and 9 Table 1 show that length of stay decreased by 0.05 days on
a base of 5.42 days in the specication in levels { a decline of approximately 1 percent. Estimates
in column 2 show a 0.12 percent decline in the specication in logs. These two results are slightly
dierent because of skewness in length of stay, but they both indicate a statistically signicant
reduction, though the log specication is only signicant at the 10 percent level using the block
bootstrap condence intervals. Because taking logs increases the weight on shorter stays, this
dierence suggests that the reform had a larger impact on longer stays. In unreported results,
we also estimate models of the probability a patient exceeds specic length of stay cutos. The
results validate the ndings that compare level and log outcomes (column 1 and 2). Patients
were statistically signicantly roughly 10 percent less likely to stay beyond 13 and 30 days in
Massachusetts after the reform. The probabilities of staying beyond shorter cutos (2, 5 and 9
days) were unchanged. The results suggest that patients were signicantly more likely to stay at
19least 3 days though the magnitude of the coecient suggests an increase of only 1 percent relative
to the baseline share.
To address the concern that our estimated reduction in length of stay was driven by dierential
selection of healthier patients into the hospital after the reform in MA, we report results controlling
for risk adjustment variables in the last row of all specications in Table 1. The estimated decreases
in length of stay and log length of stay are at least twice as pronounced in the specications that
include risk adjusters. We interpret this to indicate that holding the makeup of the patient pool
constant, length of stay declined. The comparison between the baseline and risk-adjusted results
suggests that, if anything, patients requiring longer length of stays selected into the patient pool
in post-reform Massachusetts.
One plausible mechanism for the decline in length of stay is limited hospital capacity. As with
patient severity, capacity constraints are interesting in their own right, but they could bias our
estimates of other reform impacts. Capacity itself is endogenous and may have changed with the
reform, as we saw in the model with number of beds as the dependent variable. In a simple queuing
model of hospital demand and bed size, Joskow (1980) shows that, under general assumptions,
the probability that a patient is turned away from a hospital is endogenously determined by the
hospital when it selects a reserve ratio (the dierence between the total number of beds and the
average daily census (ADC) relative to the standard deviation in arrival rates).21 Because beds are
a xed cost, capacity and utilization are a source of scale economies for hospitals. If hospitals seek
to improve eciency (potentially when faced with increased pricing pressure from insurers after
the reform) we would expect to see improved throughput in an eort to lower cost. One means of
accomplishing this is to make smaller increases in capacity relative to demand following the reform.
Our results can provide some insight into whether changes in length of stay seem to be related
to capacity by comparing the additional capacity that resulted from the decrease in length of stay
relative to the magnitude of the change in discharges. Because hospitals care about total changes
in capacity, not just among the nonelderly, we use estimates for the change in length of stay among
the entire population reported in column 7 of Table 6. The new, lower average length of stay is
5:88   0:06 = 5:82 days. This would make room for an extra (0:06  5;616)=(5:88   0:06) = 58




20discharges. An extra 58 discharges exceeds the estimated increase of 19 discharges (from column
1 of Table 2). We note, however, that the upper bound of the 95% condence interval for the
estimated change in total discharges is greater than 58. Thus, decreased length of stay could have
been a response to increased supply side constraints, although this explanation would be more
convincing if the point estimate for the change in the number of discharges were positive and closer
to change in the supply-side constraint of 58.22
4.2.3 Impact on Access, Prevention, Quality and Safety
One potentially important role for insurance is to reduce the cost of obtaining preventive care that
can improve health and/or reduce future inpatient expenditures. In this case, moral hazard can be
dynamically ecient by increasing up front care that results in future cost reductions (Chernew et
al. (2007)). One manifestation of a lack of coverage that has received substantial attention is the
use of the emergency room (ER) as a provider of last resort. If people do not have a regular point
of access to the health care system and, instead, go to the emergency room only when they become
suciently sick, such behavior can lead them to forego preventive care and, potentially, increase the
cost of future treatment. In addition, emergency room care could be ceteris paribus more expensive
to provide than primary care because of the cost of operating an ER relative to other outpatient
settings. Although we do not observe all emergency room discharges, we can examine inpatient
admissions from the emergency room as a rough measure of emergency room usage. A decrease in
admissions from the ER after the reform is evidence that a subset of the population that previously
accessed inpatient care through the emergency room accessed inpatient care through a traditional
primary care channel or avoided inpatient care entirely (perhaps by obtaining outpatient care).
In specication 10 of Table 1, we examine the impact of the reform on discharges for which the
emergency room was the source of admission. We see that the reform resulted in a 2.02 percentage
point reduction in the fraction of admissions from the emergency room. Relative to an initial
mean in Massachusetts of 38.7 percent this estimate represents a decline in inpatient admissions
originating in the emergency room of 5.2 percent. The risk-adjusted estimate reported in the
22Although we do not nd much evidence for capacity constraints in the inpatient setting, there is anecdotal
evidence for capacity constraints in the outpatient primary care setting. Investigating constraints in that setting is
beyond the scope of this paper.
21bottom row of specication 10 is very similar.23
As a further specication check, we decompose the eect by zip code income quartile in section
5. To the extent that income is a proxy for ex ante coverage levels, we expect larger declines in
inpatient admissions originating in the ER among relatively poorer populations. The results in
section 5 conform to our expectations. We nd that the reduction in emergency admissions was
particularly pronounced among people from zip codes in the lowest income quartile. As reported in
the bottom panel of Table 7, the coecient estimate suggests a 12.2 percent reduction (signicant
at the 1 percent level) in inpatient emissions from the emergency room. The eect in the top two
income quartiles, on the other hand, is not statistically signicantly dierent from zero (coecient
estimate of -0.0107 and 0.0098 for the 3rd and 4th income quartiles respectively). Taken together,
these results suggest that the reform did reduce use of the ER as a point of entry into inpatient
care. This eect was driven by expanded coverage, particularly among lower income populations.
In addition to the use of the ER, we are interested in measuring whether providing health
insurance directly aects access to and use of preventive care or quality of care provided. To
investigate the impact of the reform on prevention, quality of care, and safety, we use the four sets
of measures developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ): prevention
quality indicators (PQIs), inpatient quality indicators (IQIs), patient safety indicators (PSIs), and
pediatric quality indicators (PDIs).24 See Appendix D for more details on these measures. Each set
of quality indicators includes several outcomes developed by doctors and health services researchers
to measure quality. Since the hospital's production function is complex, it is possible for the reform
to have improved some quality measures and negatively impacted others. In general, we expect
widespread health insurance to increase prevention quality, but the impact on the other measures
is ambiguous.
To investigate the impact of the reform on prevention, we use the PQI measures, which were
developed as a means to measure the quality of outpatient care using inpatient data, which are more
23We note that these results dier somewhat from discussions in media and policy circles (Kowalczyk (2010)). Our
analysis diers for a few reasons. First, we are focused solely on inpatient admissions from the ER. While this limits
the scope of our results, it allows us to focus on a population of particular importance, the relatively sick and costly
populations who, ultimately, receive care in the hospital. A second issue with the existing discussion of Massachusetts
ER usage is the lack of a control group. Our results take into account trends in ER usage nationwide that are likely
to be changing over time. Using this approach we are better able to account for changes in ER usage unrelated to the
reform that aect MA, though we note that our ndings do not appear to be driven by dierential trends in states
other than Massachusetts (see Figure 2).
24We thank Carlos Dobkin for suggesting the use of these indicators.
22readily available. The appearance of certain preventable conditions in the inpatient setting, such as
appendicitis that results in perforation of the appendix, or diabetes that results in lower extremity
amputation, is evidence that adequate outpatient care was not obtained. All of the prevention
quality measures are indicator variables that indicate the presence of a diagnosis that should not
be observed in inpatient data if adequate outpatient care was obtained.25 One concern in using
these measures over a relatively narrow window of time is that we might not expect to see any
impact of prevention on inpatient admissions. However, validating these measures with physicians
suggest that the existence of a PQI admissions is likely due to short term management of disease
in an outpatient setting (e.g. cleaning and treating diabetic foot ulcers to avoid amputations due
to gangrene), that we expect would be manifest within the post-reform period.26 Interpreted with
dierent emphasis, these measures also capture impacts on health through averted hospitalizations.
We run our dierence-and-dierence estimator separately for each quality measure using the binary
numerator as the outcome variable, and the denominator to select the sample.
Table 3 presents regression results for each of the prevention quality indicators. Each regression
is a separate row of the table. In the rst row, the outcome is the\Overall PQI"measure suggested
by AHRQ { a dummy variable that indicates the presence of any of the prevention quality indicators
on a specic discharge.27 We nd little overall eect in the base specication.28 One advantage of
examining this measure relative to the individual component measures is that doing so mitigates
concerns about multiple hypothesis testing. The following rows show that of the 13 individual PQI
measures, 3 exhibit a statistically signicant decrease, 9 exhibit no statistically signicant change,
and 1 exhibits a statistically signicant increase. Taken together, these results suggest that there
25The calculation of each one of these quality indicators is often based on a complicated algorithm because the
diagnosis rst needs to be identied, and then specic discharges must be excluded based on secondary diagnoses
and risk factors that mitigate the potential for prevention. Each quality measure includes a numerator { a specic
condition, as well as a denominator { the population at risk for this specic condition { sometimes the entire population
in a geographic area. The presence of the numerator and denominator allows a researcher to calculate rates with
data for a single hospital. Since our research design compares hospitals to each other and to themselves over time,
we do not calculate any of the measures as rates. Instead, we use a dummy dependent variable to indicate inclusion
in the numerator { the presence of a quality measure on a specic discharge. For each quality measure, we restrict
the sample to discharges included in the denominator.
26We thank Dr. Katrina Abuabara for discussing each of these PQI measures and the associated treatment regime
and potential for inpatient admission.
27PQI 02 is excluded from this measure, presumably because it has a dierent denominator.
28We note that in previous work with a shorter post-reform period (Kolstad and Kowalski (2010)) we found larger
eects on the PQI measures. The decline in the unadjusted estimate may suggest that there was only a short term
impact of the reform on preventive care. Future work that incorporates a longer time period and panel data would
be better able to model such dynamics.
23may have been small impacts on preventive care but little overall eect in reducing the number of
preventable admissions.
We also estimate the model including controls for severity. If the impact of insurance or outpa-
tient care on the existence of a PQI varies in patient severity, it is possible that the small estimated
eects mask a compositional eect of the inpatient population after the reform. That is, if relatively
severe patients are more likely to be hospitalized with a PQI, regardless of the outpatient care they
receive, then estimates that hold the patient population xed provide a better estimate for the
impact of the reform on preventive care. These results are contained in the right panel of Table 3.
For the overall PQI measure, the coecient on MAAfter is -0.0023 and is statistically signicant
at the 1 percent level. Compared to the baseline rate of PQIs, this corresponds to a decline of 2.7
percent in preventable admissions. Results for the individual measures tell a similar story. Taken
together, these results suggest that there was a small overall eect of the reform on preventable
admissions but, holding the severity of the population xed, there were signicant declines. We
nd that, if anything, the inpatient population was more severe after the reform. Thus comparing
the two coecients { with and without risk adjustment { suggests that the eect of the reform on
reducing preventable admissions was largest among relatively less severe patients.
To supplement our analysis of preventive care, we also estimate models of prevention using data
from the BRFSS for 2004-2009. The BRFSS is a state-based system of health surveys that collects
information on health risk behaviors, preventive practices, and health care access.29 The results
are presented in Table 4. Column 1 presents the dierences-in-dierences estimate for the impact
of reform on those reporting they have health insurance coverage. Consistent with the results from
the CPS, we nd an increase in coverage in Massachusetts after the reform relative to before relative
to other states of roughly 5 percent. The remaining seven columns present results that are relevant
to outpatient and preventive care. In column 2, we see a signicant increase of 1.26 percent in
individuals reporting they had a personal doctor. The reform also led to a decline in individuals
reporting they could not access care due to cost by 3.06 percentage points. Columns 4-8 present
29The BRFSS is a cross-sectional telephone survey conducted by state health departments on a monthly basis with
technical and methodological assistance provided by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Sampling follows a mul-
tistage design based on random-digit-dialing in order to select a representative sample from the non-institutionalized
adult population in each state and territory. Our sample from BRFSS data contain 2,293,672 observations; in the
analysis, data are weighted for the probability of selection of a telephone number, the number of adults in a house-
hold, and the number of telephones in a household; post-stratication adjustments are also made for non-response
and non-coverage of households without telephones.
24di-in-di estimates for the impact of the reform on a set of direct measures of preventive care.
We nd little overall impact in the population. The only statistically signicant estimate is for the
impact of the reform on receiving a u vaccination.
We next return to the NIS and focus on Patient Safety Indicators { measures of the quality of
care provided in the inpatient setting. If achieving near-universal coverage altered the way care was
delivered in the hospital setting, we expect to see shifts in patient safety indicators { outcomes that
should not be observed if appropriate care is provided. The lower panel of Table 3 presents a full
set of PSI measures with and without risk adjusters. One issue in estimating models using the PSIs
is the relevant population at risk. Unlike most PQI measures, PSI outcomes are only relevant for
a subset of the populations (e.g. obstetric trauma can only occur if a woman is pregnant). Thus,
we do not have a single pooled measure of PQIs but instead present the full sample estimated
separately among the relative population at risk for each.
The outcomes in Table 3 suggest that, overall, patient safety was improved following the expan-
sion in insurance coverage. Of the 23 PSIs, we nd statistically signicant improvements for 13, no
change for 7 and declines for 3. Not only is the eect of the reform statistically signicant on those
that improved but they also appear to be economically signicant. For example, mortality for low
mortality DRGs declined by roughly one third of its baseline level and pressure ulcers was reduced
by 36 percent relative to baseline.
In addition to the PQI and PSI measures we also estimate models that represent quality of care
for adult and pediatric populations { Inpatient Quality Indicators and Pediatric Quality Indicators.
As discussed above, we do not have a strong prior about the impact of coverage expansions on these
indicators. Empirical results are correspondingly mixed. Although there were decreases in some
measures and increases in others, no general pattern is visible. Appendix Table 6 reports the results
for these two measures. The reform was particularly unlikely to improve quality for pediatric pa-
tients. Since many children were already covered by Medicaid before the reform, it seems plausible
that gains in pediatric quality had already been realized before the reform. Indeed, Dafny and Gru-
ber (2005) examine the eect of Medicaid expansions on pediatric hospitalizations, and their results
are broadly consistent with the results that we nd for the general population. They use a measure
of\avoidable"hospitalizations that seems to have been a precursor for the AHRQ measures. They
nd that pediatric length of stay decreased (as do we among the nonelderly), pediatric admissions
25increased (we nd no change among the nonelderly), and avoidable pediatric hospitalizations did
not increase as much as unavoidable pediatric hospitalizations (we nd a decrease in preventable
hospitalizations among the nonelderly).
4.2.4 Impact on Hospital Costs
In this section, we investigate the impact of the reform on hospital costs. The cost impact, as
we discuss above, depends on the relative changes in incentives facing hospitals and physicians
in treatment and investment decisions. In the presence of moral hazard or income eects we
expect that the large coverage expansion in Massachusetts would lead the newly insured to seek
additional care and, conditional on use, more expensive care (e.g. Pauly (1968); Manning et
al. (1987); Kowalski (2009)). Insurers are also able to negotiate lower prices for care and, in
the case of managed care plans, address treatment decisions directly through quantity limits (i.e.
prior authorization rules that require a physician to get approval from the insurer in order for a
procedure to be reimbursed, etc.) (Cutler et al. (2000)). Thus, increases in coverage could lead to
a countervailing decrease in cost with insurance coverage. Consequently, it is an empirical question
whether increases in health insurance coverage among the hospitalized population will raise or lower
cost.
To measure hospital costs directly, we obtained hospital level all-payer cost to charge ratios.
Hospitals are required to report these ratios to Medicare on an annual basis. The numerator of the
ratio represents the annual total costs of operating the hospital such as overhead costs, salaries, and
equipment.30 The denominator of this ratio represents annual total charges across all payers, which
we observe disaggregated by discharge in the NIS. With our information on total charges from
the NIS, we can get an accurate measure of total costs at the hospital level. Several papers in the
economics literature measure total costs at the discharge ratio by deating total charges by the cost
to charge ratio (see e.g. Almond et al. (2010). However, since there is no variation in observed costs
at a level ner than the hospital level, estimating such a regression requires the strong assumption
that the ratio of costs to charges is the same for all discharges within the hospital. Since we are
interested in hospital-level costs, we need not impose this assumption, and we can focus on results
30Costs do not include the cost of uncompensated care, which presumably declined with the increase in insurance
coverage.
26at the hospital level.
Table 5 presents dierence-in-dierence estimates for the impact of the reform on hospital
costs using a variety of specications. The rst column presents estimates in levels. The coecient
estimate of 9.54 is not statistically signicantly dierent from zero. The logarithmic specication in
column 2 yields a negative estimate for the impact of the reform on cost, though the coecient is also
insignicant. The dierence between the two, though not statistically signicant, can be explained
in that the logarithmic specication takes into account trends in growth for both treatment and
control groups. That is, Massachusetts had a dierential trend in cost growth relative to the rest of
the country before the reform. The log specication results indicate that this trend was not altered
by the expansion in coverage relative to trends before and after the reform in the remainder of the
country. The plots in Figure 4, which depict cost trends in Massachusetts and other states for the
outcomes in Table 5, show that Massachusetts had a higher rate of cost growth as compared to
other states before the reform. After the reform, Massachusetts relative costs appear to be in line
with their pre-reform trend.
In the next columns, and in the bottom plots in Figure 4, we model cost per day and discharge,
to account for changes in cost that may be due to changes in the intensity or total volume of patients
treated. Both results are consistent with the levels regression in column 1 and suggest that cost
growth was largely unchanged by the expansion in coverage in Massachusetts.
Decomposing the results by year, however, paints a slightly dierent picture. In the lower
panel of Table 5, we allow the post period eect to dier in 2007 and 2008 (the two years of data
we have following the reform). The coecient for MA2008 in levels is positive and statistically
signicant. Given the relatively short period of our study, it is dicult to identify dynamic eects.
However, the results do suggest that there may, eventually, have been increased cost levels, despite
little rise in the immediate aftermath. The other specications, however, do not show a signicant
dierential eect on the log, per discharge, or per day cost in 2008 in MA relative to before the
reform relative to other states. Thus, taking into account trends or volume and length of stay
changes after the reform, we do not nd increased cost even a year and a half after the full reform
(including the individual mandate) went into eect. Combining the estimates across specications,
our results imply that the Massachusetts reform did not increase the cost of hospital care relative
to the baseline trend in cost growth. Thus, the Massachusetts reform did not appear to \bend the
27cost curve" upward or downward.
5 Direct and Spillover Eects of the Reform
5.1 IV Estimates Relating Gains in Coverage to Outcomes
Using our dierence-in-dierence strategy, we have shown a reduced form impact of the reform
on utilization, outcomes, and hospital costs. These impacts are of direct policy interest in Mas-
sachusetts, and they provide suggestive evidence on the potential impact of the national reform.
To estimate the impact of insurance coverage on outcomes more generally, we can combine these
reduced form estimates with rst stage estimates of the impact of the reform on insurance coverage.
To do so entails imposing the exclusion restriction that the reform only aected the reduced form
outcomes through the expansion in insurance coverage. This exclusion restriction could be violated
for several reasons; for example, if the type of coverage and not just the expansion in coverage
matters. We report the instrumental variable estimates subject to this caveat.
When scaling our reduced form estimates by our rst stage coverage estimates, we use two sets
of rst stage coverage estimates { those from the NIS and those from the CPS. Scaling by the NIS
estimate gives the eect of reduced uninsurance in the hospital on outcomes, and scaling by the
CPS estimate gives the eect of reduced uninsurance in the population on hospital outcomes. In a
similar context, Anderson et al. (2010) use a bounding exercise to address how changes in population
coverage result in changes in hospital coverage because they only observe hospital coverage. Here,
rather than using a bounding exercise with its accompanying assumptions, we can simply scale by
the population estimate from the CPS to address this issue.
Returning to the estimated coecients on length of stay and emergency admissions, we combine
these results with the estimated coecient from the NIS uninsurance regression. We nd that a one
percentage point increase in insurance coverage in the hospital decreases length of stay by 0.022 days
(0.050/2.31) and decreases emergency admissions by 0.87 percentage points (2.02/2.31).31 Using
the CPS rst stage estimates, we nd that a one percentage point increase in insurance coverage
in the population decreases length of stay by 0.009 days (0.050/5.71) and decreases emergency
31These estimates are approximate because the two underlying estimates are estimated on slightly dierent samples
due to data availability.
28admissions by 0.37 percentage points (2.02/5.71).
5.2 Heterogeneity by Age, Gender, Income and Race
There are several reasons to examine heterogeneity in the impact of the reform by age, gender,
income, and race. The rst is to understand the incidence of the reform. Another is to understand
the impact of the coverage mandate on disparities in coverage and outcomes. A third, as discussed
above, is to identify heterogeneous impacts of expansions in coverage within groups and to look for
evidence of spillovers across groups.
Comparison of the rst stage results in the NIS and the CPS for all non-elderly demographic
groups suggests that a one percentage point increase in population coverage translated into a 0.4
(2.31/5.71) percentage point increase in coverage in the hospital. If demographic groups gain
insurance coverage in the population and in the hospital at the same rate, we expect the ratio of
the NIS rst stage to the CPS rst stage to be the same across demographic groups. However,
it is possible that population coverage translates into hospital coverage dierently for dierent
demographic groups (e.g. if men have bigger gains in coverage in the hospital than in the population
because hospitalized men tend to have lower incomes).32 Dierential changes in hospital coverage
relative to population coverage within a demographic group will be reected in the ratio of the NIS
rst stage result to the CPS rst stage result within that demographic group.
Comparing changes in coverage by age in the NIS in Table 6 and in the CPS in Appendix
Table 2, we see that the ratio is generally constant across demographic groups at roughly the
population ratio of 0.4. This comparison provides further evidence that the reform itself did not
lead to large dierential selection into hospitals based on observable characteristics. However, for
individuals 27-30 and for individuals 45-54, a one percentage point increase in population coverage
translated into a 0.13 (0.022/0.166) and 0.67 (0.028/0.042) percentage point increase in hospital
coverage, respectively. Thus, it seems that younger individuals were less likely to gain coverage in
the hospital than they were in the population, presumably because younger hospitalized already
had higher rates of coverage. The reverse was true for older individuals. To address these dierences
in the propensity of coverage in the population to translate into coverage in the hospital, we prefer
32Dierential selection into the hospital by newly insured members of each demographic group could also aect the
translation of population coverage into actual coverage. However, we nd limited scope for dierential selection into
the hospital in section 4.2.1.
29to use the CPS rst stage rather than the NIS rst stage to scale our IV estimate within each
demographic subgroup.
In Table 6 and Appendix Table 2, we examine changes in coverage by age in the NIS and the
CPS, respectively. As expected, increases in coverage are most pronounced in the nonelderly, but
the elderly did experience small gains in coverage, mostly through Medicaid. As our insurance
variable reports the primary payer for the discharge, increases in Medicaid coverage could indicate
that some individuals eligible for Medicare also became eligible for Medicaid, and Medicaid became
the primary payer. As discussed above, Medicare does not cover all elderly individuals, and some
elderly people might have gained coverage through the Medicaid expansions or through CommCare.
Among the elderly in MA in 2008 Q4, 808 elderly discharges, including 466 discharges for age 75+,
report CommCare as the primary payer.
From the bottom rows of Table 6, we see that decreases in uninsurance were largest among
individuals aged 19-26. These individuals predominantly obtained coverage through Medicaid and
CommCare. Individuals of all ages obtained CommCare, and takeup of CommCare is largest
among the near elderly hospitalized population, aged 55-64. All nonelderly age groups experienced
a statistically signicant decline in private coverage, providing further evidence that public coverage
crowed out private coverage within the hospitalized population.33
When we turn to outcomes by age in specications 7 to 9 in Table 6, we see some heterogeneity
in estimated eects of length of stay across age groups, with some groups experiencing statistically
signicant decreases and others experiencing statistically signicant increases. Since all groups
experienced expanded coverage in the NIS and the CPS, this implies variation in the within group
instrumental variables estimates of the impact of coverage on length of stay. In contrast, admissions
from the emergency room declined for all ages. The NIS and CPS IV estimates for the eect of
coverage on inpatient admissions from the ER are uniformly negative for all individuals over 18
and, generally, increase with age. This provides further evidence that, in the absence of the newly
provided coverage, uninsured individuals were seeking care through the ER. We would expect health
status to decline with age and thus, use of the ER as a point of entry into the health care system
should also increase with age if this is the primary point of access for those without insurance. The
33Crowd out among young adults is likely to be less pronounced than in the general population because young
adults with CommCare coverage tend to be healthy and less likely to have inpatient stays.
30CPS IV estimate for the impact of a one percentage point increase in population coverage among
individuals 27-30 is a 0.13 percentage point reduction in the probability of an inpatient admission
originating in the ER. The estimated impact for those from 31-40, 41-54, and 55-64 is a 0.33, 1.22,
and 1.12 percentage point reduction respectively.
In the top panel of Table 7 and Appendix Table 3, we report dierence-in-dierence results
for insurance coverage by gender in the NIS and CPS, respectively. From the mean coverage
rate in the lower rows, we can see that Massachusetts males were approximately twice as likely
to be uninsured as Massachusetts women before the reform, and though males experienced larger
gains in coverage than women during the reform, males were still almost twice as likely to be
uninsured after the reform.34 If changes in outcomes for a particular group occur directly through
changes in insurance coverage for that group and there are no heterogeneous treatment eects,
men's outcomes should show a larger change than women's because their coverage changed more.
We do nd larger decreases for men for length of stay, inpatient admissions from the ER, and some
and cost measures. The IV estimate for the impact of population coverage on admissions from the
ER is relatively uniform across the two groups with a predicted reduction of 0.39 and 0.27 percent
for a one percent increase in coverage for men and women respectively.
In the lower panel of Table 7 and Appendix Table 3, we report dierence-in-dierence results
for insurance coverage by the income quartile of the patient's zip code.35 People from the lowest
income zip codes are over-represented in hospital discharges, making up 28% of the sample. People
from these poorest zip codes experienced the largest gains in coverage, mostly driven by increases in
Medicaid and CommCare. People from the richest zip codes experienced no statistically signicant
change in coverage overall and the only statistically signicant eects were on Other and CommCare
coverage. The largest increases in CommCare coverage occurred for patients in the second lowest
income quartile, which seems plausible because Medicaid was aimed at the poor, and CommCare
was particularly targeted at the near poor. However, CommCare coverage reached people in zip
34It is not surprising that males had lower initial rates of coverage than females because Medicaid programs explicitly
have more lenient eligibility thresholds for women, especially single mothers. Furthermore, coverage is often more
valuable for women of child-bearing age because childbirth is an expensive and common medical expense.
35Income thresholds that determine the quartile of income for each zip code are dierent in every year. For 2008,
the lowest quartile ranged from $1 to $38,999, the second ranged from $39,000 to $48,999, the third ranged from
$49,000 to $63,999, and the fourth was greater than or equal to $64,000. The quartile of income is suppressed for any
zip code with a population below a certain threshold and for any zip code that is the only zip code in its state in the
given quartile.
31codes of all income quartiles, consistent with heterogeneity in income within zip codes.
Specications 7 to 9 of Table 7 show changes in outcomes by zip code income quartile. Inter-
estingly, the impact of the reform on both the level and log of LOS is positive and signicant for
individuals from the poorest zip codes. Individuals from the second income quartile, however, saw
statistically signicant declines in LOS in both levels and logs. As discussed above, decreases in
emergency admissions are particularly pronounced for individuals in the lowest income zip codes,
for which Medicaid expansions were the largest. Other outcomes show minimal heterogeneity across
the income categories, though this could be due in part to the fact that estimates for costs are based
on hospital level cost to charge ratios that could obscure within hospital heterogeneity in costs by
income.
Finally, we examine heterogeneity in coverage by race in the NIS in Table 8 and in the CPS
in Appendix Table 4. From the means in the bottom rows of each cell, we can see that whites
had the highest levels of insurance coverage before the reform. In percentage point terms, all races
experienced gains in coverage, but people identied as black, Hispanic, or of unknown race, experi-
enced the largest increases in coverage through the reform. Medicaid expansions were also largest
among these groups. Native Americans, which make up less than one percent of the population,
experienced the largest gains in private coverage. People of all races took up coverage through
CommCare at varying rates. The reform reduced disparities in coverage by race, but it did not
eliminate them.
In columns 7 to 9 of Table 8, we examine outcomes by race. We see more heterogeneity in the
estimated changes in outcomes across the race categories than we do across other demographic cat-
egories. Although we see decreases in length of stay among White patients, length of stay increased
among Black, Hispanic, Asian and Native American patients. Admissions from the emergency room
declined across most races with the exception of Asian patients. Overall, it appears that within-race
changes in outcomes are not directly related to within-race changes in insurance coverage.
Our instrumental variable estimates for some outcomes vary substantially across the subgroups
we analyze. Furthermore, though there is less variation in the direction of the results for length
of stay, the NIS and CPS IV estimates are not proportional across subgroups. This could be
evidence for spillovers from insurance coverage in the hospital production function or it could
reect heterogeneity in the underlying impact of insurance on outcomes by subgroup, perhaps by
32type of coverage. One plausible mechanism for the former is that hospitals, facing convergence to
almost complete insurance coverage, alter the way in which they provide care to all patients, not
only those who are newly insured. Put dierently, our estimates suggest that expanding coverage to
near-universal levels, particularly among the relatively young, impacts care for other populations,
including the elderly, who typically have coverage through Medicare. If overall coverage levels
impact care among those who are already covered, an externality exists in an individual's choice
to purchase health insurance. Among all of our outcome measures, we nd the least evidence for
spillovers in inpatient admissions from the ER. However, barring network eects within a community
or supply side constraints within an ER, we would not expect a change in coverage of one individual
to change the ER usage of another.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the Massachusetts health insurance reform expanded coverage among
the inpatient hospital population by approximately 36 percent relative to its pre-reform level.
Among this population, we see some evidence of crowd of out private coverage by subsidized
coverage, but we do not nd evidence for crowd out in the general population, suggesting that
the incidence of crowd out diers by health status.
We show declines in length of stay and admissions from the emergency room following the
reform. Our results also suggest that prevention increased outside of hospitals, resulting in a
decline in inpatient admissions for some preventable conditions, reecting a likely health impact for
individuals susceptible to these conditions. In the midst of these gains, we nd no evidence that
hospital cost growth increased. We are unable to make precise welfare statements as we do not
capture increased costs to the government and to the purchasers of health insurance that resulted
from the reform.
Combining estimates of coverage expansion with estimates of outcome changes, we estimate
the instrumental variable impact of expanded coverage on hospital outcomes and nd economically
signicant impacts. To capture the incidence of the reform, we examine changes in coverage and
outcomes by demographic group. The reform increased coverage most among young adults and
the near elderly, men, people from the lowest income zip codes, and people identied as black and
33Hispanic.
This paper is the rst to examine the eect of Massachusetts health insurance reform on hospital
outcomes. In other research, we aim to answer other economic questions using variation induced by
health insurance reform in Massachusetts. In Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we examine the impact
of individually mandated health insurance coverage on the labor market.
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Appendices
A Block Bootstrap
Since our main identifying variation is at the state-time level, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004),
and block bootstrap our condence intervals by state. Doing so allows for an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix within states across time. In this section, we discuss some implementation details
that are not discussed by Bertrand et al. (2004). First, the empirical simulation results using the
CPS presented by Bertrand et al. (2004) assume that half of the states are treated and the other
half are untreated. Since we have only one treated state, it is only sampled in approximately one
third of block bootstrap draws. In these draws, the dierence-in-dierence coecient on MAAfter
cannot be estimated. In practice, we include these replications in the bootstrap sample to estimate
the condence intervals on the other coecients without bias. We use a large number of bootstrap
replications { 1,000 { so that the condence intervals on our coecient of interest are still based
on a large number of bootstrap replications.36
Second, all of our regressions are weighted. To address weighting within our block bootstrap
procedure, we sample states with replacement. Within a state, the sum of the weights does not
36Diculties in the block bootstrap procedure aside, we acknowledge that having only one treated state potentially
limits the external validity of our results. To address this limitation, we consider level and trend dierences between
MA and other states, which we discuss in Section 4.1.2.
38change because all observations from a given state are drawn at once. However, the sum of the
weights varies across regressions because not all states are sampled and some states are sampled
more than once.
B Robustness of Insurance Results
One potential concern about the external validity of our results is that Massachusetts could dier
from the remainder of the country in ways that we do not observe, and these dierences could lead
to changes in coverage at the same time that the reform was implemented. Such dierences could
be due, for example, to factors that aected the entire Northeast. Alternately, it could be due
to factors that aected states with relatively low levels of uninsurance. To account for potential
unobserved dierences that are correlated with observed dierences in uninsurance, we estimate
a series of specications in our nonelderly sample, in which we restrict the comparison groups to
states most similar to Massachusetts. We present these results in Appendix Table 7.
We rst examine changes in uninsurance. When we restrict the comparison group of hospitals
to hospitals in the Northeast Census division in the second panel, the impact of the reform on
uninsurance is smaller than it is in the preferred specication, reproduced in the rst panel. As
reported in the means at the bottom of the column, the initial level of insurance coverage in the
comparison states in the Northeast Census division was similar to the initial level of insurance
coverage in the comparison states in the national sample. Similarly, in the third panel, when we
restrict the comparison group to include only New England states, which had an initial lower but
not statistically lower rate of uninsurance than Massachusetts, the estimated impact of the reform
falls to a 1.59 percentage point reduction in uninsurance. This is statistically smaller than the
baseline eect, but it remains signicantly dierent from zero at the 1% level despite the much
smaller sample size. To investigate the possibility that this change in magnitude is due to the
limited health reforms that occurred in 2006 in Maine, Vermont and San Francisco, California, in
column 4, we estimate the main specication in the full sample but we exclude Maine, Vermont,
and California. Reassuringly, our point estimate remains unchanged from our main specication.
As an alternative specication check, we estimate the same specication on the sample of the 25
states with the highest levels of nonelderly insurance coverage before the reform in the CPS. Our
39point estimate is not statistically dierent from that in the main specication.
In the remaining columns of Appendix Table 7, we present similar specications for each of our
main outcomes of interest. In general, our quantitative conclusions as well as our qualitative con-
clusions are unchanged when we change the group of comparison states. Our emergency admission
result is particularly robust.
An additional issue in extrapolating from our Massachusetts results is that Massachusetts had
a relatively smaller potential increase in insurance due to its high baseline level. If the cost of
expanding coverage is convex, we expect larger reductions in uninsurance from the same policies in
locations with higher baseline levels of uninsurance. We could test this proposition if another state
with a dierent baseline level of uninsurance enacted the same policies. In the absence of such a
natural experiment, we look for suggestive evidence in support of this hypothesis by examining the
eect of the reform by baseline levels of insurance coverage within Massachusetts on the hospital
level.
In Appendix Table 8, we divide hospitals based on their initial level of insurance coverage
in the pre-reform period. Because not all hospitals in the sample were in the pre-reform data,
we rst restrict the sample to hospitals that appear at least once in the sample in the Before
period. These results are presented in the second panel. Estimating the average impact of the
reform in this subsample, we nd that impact of the reform remained virtually unchanged, 1.52
percentage points compared to 1.53. We then divide the sample into two groups based on whether
the hospital had below- or above-median levels of uninsurance in the Before period. In among
hospitals Massachusetts in the sample in the Before period, 29 hospitals had uninsurance below the
national median, and the remaining 11 hospitals had uninsurance above the national median. We
are able to estimates statistically signicant impacts on uninsurance in both groups of hospitals,
but estimates based on hospitals with below-median uninsurance are more precise.
Estimates from the rst column of the third and fourth panels show that the impact of the
reform was statistically indistinguishable in hospitals with lower initial rates of uninsurance (a 1.78
percentage point increase in coverage) and hospitals with higher initial rates of uninsurance (a 1.65
percentage point increase in coverage). Although we might have expected that convex cost of cover-
age expansion would have led to greater reductions in uninsurance in hospitals with initially higher
rates of uninsurance, the results are not statistically dierent from each other. As shown in the
40second to fourth columns, impacts on length of stay and admissions from the ER were also similar
across both groups of hospitals. Without recovering the structural parameters that determine the
cost of coverage expansion it is dicult to make precise out of sample predictions. However, these
ndings suggest the results we nd in Massachusetts, which had lower initial uninsurance than
other states, could be similar to the impact of the national reform.
C Risk Adjustment
Selection into hospitals after the reform in Massachusetts is an outcome of interest in its own
right, which we address as a complement to our analysis, but to examine causal changes in other
outcomes, we control for characteristics of the patient pool. To do so, we use six37 sets of risk ad-
justment variables: demographic characteristics, the number of diagnoses on the discharge record,
individual components of the Charlson Score measure of comorbidities, AHRQ comorbidity mea-
sures, All-Patient Rened Diagnosis Related Groups (APR-DRG)s, and All-Payer Severity-adjusted
(APS)-DRGs. Each risk adjustment measure was developed with a slightly dierent purpose, but
the correlation among them is high. Since our focus is on controlling for selection and not on in-
vestigating the relative merit of each measure, we include all risk adjustment variables in the same
specication. We run all of our regressions on the discharge level, as opposed to the hospital level,
to capture the interactions between measures on the discharge level.
We construct the rst four measures ourselves from the information in the discharge records.
First, we include the same demographic measures that we include in specication 3 of Table 1 {
saturated controls in race, gender, and income, as well as age and age squared. Second, following
Gruber and Kleiner (2010), we control for the number of diagnoses on the hospital discharge
record. The number of diagnoses in our nonelderly sample varies from 0 to 15, the average is 5, and
the maximum potentially reported is 15. Third, using data on the composition of diagnoses, we
calculate and control for the individual components of the Charlson Score.38 The Charlson score,
which includes 18 components, has been shown to have a strong relationship with mortality (Quan
et al. (n.d.)). The average number of components in our nonelderly data is 0.37, and the maximum
37In Kolstad and Kowalski (2010), we included a seventh set of risk adjusters, Medstat disease staging measures,
but we must omit them here because they are no longer available in 2008.
38See Charlson et al. (1987) for the origin of the Charlson Score measures. We draw our Charlson Score code from
http://healthservices.cancer.gov/seermedicare/program/charlson.comorbidity.macro.txt.
41is 9. Fourth, we control for the 29 AHRQ comorbidity measures. The nonelderly mean in our data
is 1 and the maximum is 14.
The remaining two measures were constructed in our data using proprietary algorithms. The
APR-DRG measures and the APS-DRG measures, developed by 3M, were developed as rene-
ments to the existing Rened DRGs (R-DRGs) and All-Patient DRGs (AP-DRGs) systems, which
expanded the DRG system beyond the Medicare population. The APR-DRG and APS-DRG mea-
sures include further adjustments for severity and for neonatal discharges. There are two separate
APR-DRG measures: a mortality-specic measure and a general severity measure. We include both
measures in each specication. The mortality measure takes on integer values from 0 to 4 with a
mean in our data of 1.3, and the severity measure takes on the same values with a mean of 1.7.
There are three APS-DRG measures: one charge-specic measure, one length of stay-specic
measure, and one mortality-specic measure. Each outcome-specic APS-DRG measure was de-
veloped using the 2000 NIS data, and is standardized to have a mean of 1 in that sample (HSS,
Inc. (2003)). Multiplying the outcome-specic measure by the mean of that outcome in the 2000
NIS gives a prediction of the expected value of that outcome. For example, the mean charge in
the 2000 NIS was $13,241.41, and the largest value of the charge-specic APS-DRG for a discharge
in our nonelderly sample was 26.21, so predicted charges for that discharge would be $347,057 in
the year 2000. To interpret the other magnitudes, the mean LOS in the 2000 NIS was 4.5096, and
mean mortality in the 2000 NIS was 0.0247 deaths per discharge. In our sample including all ages,
the means of each measure are slightly than the standardized value of 1.0, reecting real changes
in since the year 2000 and sampling changes from the 2000 NIS to 2004-2007 NIS. The charges
measure takes on values from 0.09 to 26.21, with a mean of 0.88 in the nonelderly sample; the
length of stay measure takes on values from 0.21 to 19.02, with a mean of 0.93 in the nonelderly
sample; and the mortality measure takes on values from 0 to 46.74, with a mean of 0.69 in the
nonelderly sample. We include all three measures in each specication. The second specication
of Appendix Table 5 reports the coecients on all risk adjustment variables in the risk-adjusted
uninsurance regression reported in the last row of the rst specication in Table 1.
42D Quality Indicators
We use software from AHRQ to calculate these measures in our NIS data (Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (2007a)). For each set of indicators, we use the most recent set of code
that does not include a windows executable le. We use the December 2009 Version 4.1 of the
Prevention Quality Indicators (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2007e)), the March
2008 Version 3.2a of the Inpatient Quality Indicators with results of the DRG grouper software
merged on from the NIS Severity le (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2007c)), the
January 2009 Version 3.2a of the Patient Safety Indicators (Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (2007d)), and the December 2009 Version 4.1 of the Pediatric Quality Indicators (Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (2007f)). The overall pediatric quality indicator is an indicator
for any one of PDI 14 (Chronic), 15 (Chronic), 16 (Acute), or 17 (Acute), set to zero for age less
than six.
43 
Source: CPS March Supplement 2004-2009, authors’ calculations.   
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2004 Q1 2006 Q3 2008 Q4
MA Non
Emergency Admit
Source: NIS authors’ calculations.
Trends obtained from regressions including hospital fixed effects.
95% asympototic confidence intervals shown.
Confidence intervals clustered by state for Non−MA and robust for MA.
All data omitted in 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4 because of MA data availability.
Vertical lines separate During and After periods.









































































2004 Q1 2006 Q3 2008 Q4
MA Non
APSDRG Charge Weight
Source: NIS authors’ calculations.
Trends obtained from regressions including hospital fixed effects.
95% asympototic confidence intervals shown.
Confidence intervals clustered by state for Non−MA and robust for MA.
All data omitted in 2006 Q4 and 2007 Q4 because of MA data availability.
Vertical lines separate During and After periods.




















































Costs Per Total Discharge
Source: NIS authors’ calculations.
For this figure, data collapsed annually by hospital, excluding Q4.
All Q4 data omitted because of MA data availability.
Trends obtained from regressions including hospital fixed effects.
95% asympototic confidence intervals shown.
Confidence intervals clustered by state for Non−MA and robust for MA.
Vertical lines separate 2006 from other years.
Trends in MA vs Non−MA
Hospital−Year Level, Excluding Q4
Figure 4Table 1: Insurance and Outcomes in  NIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Uninsured Medicaid Private Medicare Other CommCare No Coverage Info
MA*After ‐0.0231 0.0389 ‐0.0306 0.0042 0.0106 0.0124 0.0015
[‐0.0300,‐0.0162]*** [0.0265,0.0512]*** [‐0.0378,‐0.0233]*** [0.0013,0.0070]*** [0.0041,0.0171]*** [0.0123,0.0124]*** [0.0000,0.0030]**
 [‐0.0299,‐0.0166]+++  [0.0293,0.051]+++   [‐0.0385,‐0.0236]+++ [0.0014,0.0068]+++   [0.0050,0.0181]+++ [0.0124,0.0125]+++   [0.0001,0.0029]++  
MA*During ‐0.0129 0.0365 ‐0.0224 ‐0.0003 ‐0.0009 0.0029 ‐0.0017
[‐0.0176,‐0.0083]*** [0.0293,0.0437]*** [‐0.0274,‐0.0173]*** [‐0.0024,0.0017] [‐0.0043,0.0026] [0.0029,0.0029]*** [‐0.0065,0.0031]
[‐0.0177,‐0.0084]+++ [0.0302,0.0438]+++   [‐0.0277,‐0.0168]+++   [‐0.0025,0.0018]*   [‐0.0049,0.0026]*  [0.0029,0.0029]+++ [‐0.0076,0.0014]*
N (Nonelderly) 23,860,930 23,860,930 23,860,930 23,860,930 23,860,930 23,860,930 23,913,983
R Squared 0.0659 0.1148 0.1502 0.0341 0.0689 0.0249 0.0662
Mean MA Before 0.0643 0.2460 0.5631 0.1073 0.0193 0.0000 0.0002
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0791 0.2876 0.4978 0.0928 0.0427 0.0000 0.0020
Mean MA After 0.0352 0.2594 0.5518 0.1177 0.0360 0.0165 0.0040
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0817 0.2790 0.4923 0.1020 0.0450 0.0000 0.0017
MA*After ‐0.0228 0.0374 ‐0.0275 0.0021 0.0107 0.0124 0.0014
with risk adjusters [‐0.0297,‐0.0158]*** [0.0235,0.0514]*** [‐0.0361,‐0.0190]*** [‐0.0007,0.0050] [0.0047,0.0168]*** [0.0123,0.0124]*** [0.0000,0.0028]**
R Squared 0.0939 0.2232 0.2381 0.2006 0.0761 0.0249 0.0666
(8) (9) (10)
Dependent Variable: Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
MA*After ‐0.0504 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0202
[‐0.0999,‐0.0008]** [‐0.0111,0.0086] [‐0.0397,‐0.0007]**
 [‐0.1026,‐0.0065]++ [‐0.0113,0.0066]*  [‐0.0351,0.0011]+  
MA*During ‐0.0037 0.0037 ‐0.0317***
[‐0.0369,0.0294] [‐0.0022,0.0095] [‐0.0449,‐0.0184]***
[‐0.0367,0.0238]* [‐0.0026,0.0084]*   [‐0.0409,‐0.0166]+++
N (Nonelderly) 23,913,183 23,913,183 23,913,983
R Squared 0.0335 0.0458 0.1088
Mean MA Before 5.4256 1.4267 0.3868
Mean Non‐MA Before 5.0770 1.3552 0.3591
Mean MA After 5.3717 1.4355 0.4058
Mean Non‐MA After 5.0958 1.3596 0.3745
MA*After ‐0.1037 ‐0.0105 ‐0.0220
with risk adjusters [‐0.1471,‐0.0603]*** [‐0.0186,‐0.0023]** [‐0.0427,‐0.0012]**












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Discharges Log Total Disch. Nonelderly Dischg. Log Noneld. Dischg. Elderly Dischg. Log Elderly Dischg. Hospital Bedsize
MA* After 19 0.0037 ‐7 0.0029 26 0.0115 ‐0.0032
[‐183,220] [‐0.0133,0.0206] [‐174,160] [‐0.0192,0.0250] [‐19,70] [‐0.0059,0.0289] [‐0.0165,0.0100]
N (All Ages) 18,622 18,622 18,622 18,590 18,622 18,327 18,595
Mean MA Before 5616 8.4125 3,592 7.8958 2,023 7.4190 0.6350
Mean Non‐MA Before 5029 8.1894 3,454 7.7512 1,569 7.0394 0.7529
Mean MA After 6769 8.5300 4,433 8.0369 2,336 7.5456 0.6914
Mean Non‐MA After 5389 8.2327 3,712 7.7908 1,672 7.0949 0.7602







MA* After 0.0340 0.0057 0.0062 ‐0.0059 ‐0.006 ‐0.0195
[0.0205,0.0476]*** [‐0.0050,0.0164] [‐0.0097,0.0220] [‐0.0323,0.0206] [‐0.0141,0.0022] [‐0.0310,‐0.0080]***
N (All Ages) 18,622 18,622 18,622 18,622 18,622 18,622
Mean MA Before 0.5750 1.5467 1.8892 1.1504 1.0660 1.0623
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.5058 1.4919 1.8413 1.0992 1.0313 1.0356
Mean MA After 0.7325 1.6144 1.9672 1.2324 1.0758 1.0488







Prevention Quality Indicators Improvement? MA* After Improvement? MA* After, Risk Adjusted N, Mean MA Before
PQI 90 Overall PQI ‐0.0002 [‐0.0016,0.0011] Y ‐0.0023 [‐0.0036,‐0.0009]*** 17,674,454 0.0838
PQI 01 Diabetes Short‐term Comp. Admission ‐0.0001 [‐0.0002,0.0001] ‐0.0002 [‐0.0005,0.0001] 17,674,454 0.0058
PQI 02 Perforated Appendix Admission Rate Y ‐0.0463 [‐0.0557,‐0.0368]*** Y ‐0.0072 [‐0.0133,‐0.0012]** 189,588 0.2457
PQI 03 Diabetes Long‐Term Comp. Admission 0.0000 [‐0.0002,0.0003] Y ‐0.0009 [‐0.0011,‐0.0007]*** 17,674,454 0.0083
PQI 05 COPD Admission Rate ‐0.0002 [‐0.0005,0.0001] Y ‐0.0005 [‐0.0008,‐0.0002]*** 17,674,454 0.0097
PQI 07 Hypertension Admission rate 0.0001 [‐0.0002,0.0004] 0.0001 [‐0.0002,0.0004] 17,674,454 0.0020
PQI 08 CHF Admission Rate 0.0000 [‐0.0005,0.0005] ‐0.0003 [‐0.0006,0.0001] 17,674,454 0.0109
PQI 10 Dehydration Admission Rate 0.0000 [‐0.0002,0.0002] Y ‐0.0005 [‐0.0007,‐0.0003]*** 17,674,454 0.0054
PQI 11 Bacterial Pneumonia Admission Rate 0.0001 [‐0.0005,0.0006] 0.0004 [‐0.0002,0.0009] 17,674,454 0.0172
PQI 12 Urinary Tract Infection Admission Rate ‐0.0001 [‐0.0004,0.0002] 0.0000 [‐0.0003,0.0003] 17,674,454 0.0070
PQI 13 Angina without Procedure Admission Rate N 0.0005 [0.0004,0.0007]*** N 0.0005 [0.0004,0.0007]*** 17,674,454 0.0014
PQI 14 Uncontrolled Diabetes Admission rate 0.0001 [‐0.0001,0.0003] ‐0.0001 [‐0.0003,0.0001] 17,674,454 0.0007
PQI 15 Adult Asthma Admission Rate Y ‐0.0006 [‐0.0009,‐0.0002]*** Y ‐0.0006 [‐0.0009,‐0.0003]*** 17,674,454 0.0146
PQI 16 Rate of Lower‐extremity Amputation Y ‐0.0005 [‐0.0006,‐0.0004]*** Y ‐0.0006 [‐0.0007,‐0.0005]*** 17,674,454 0.0023
Patient Safety Indicators
PSI 1 Complications of Anesthesia 0.0000 [‐0.0001,0.0002] ‐0.0001 [‐0.0002,0.0001] 5,822,429 0.0008
PSI 2 Death in Low‐Mortality DRGs Y ‐0.0001 [‐0.0001,‐0.0000]** Y ‐0.0002 [‐0.0002,‐0.0001]*** 8,223,877 0.0003
PSI 3 Pressure Ulcer Y ‐0.0040 [‐0.0051,‐0.0029]*** Y ‐0.0037 [‐0.0049,‐0.0024]*** 3,518,425 0.0110
PSI 4 Failure to Rescue 0.0106 [0.0041,0.0171]*** N 0.0073 [0.0008,0.0138]** 108,149 0.0955
PSI 6 Iatrogenic Pneumothorax, Provider Level 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0001] 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0001] 12,720,445 0.0005
PSI 7 Selected Infections Due to Medical Care Y ‐0.0005 [‐0.0007,‐0.0004]*** Y ‐0.0006 [‐0.0008,‐0.0004]*** 12,310,324 0.0021
PSI 8 Postoperative Hip Fracture N 0.0000 [‐0.0001,‐0.0000]** N 0.0000 [‐0.0001,‐0.0000]** 2,944,801 0.0002
PSI 9 Postoperative Hemorrhage or Hematoma N 0.0002 [0.0001,0.0004]** 0.0000 [‐0.0002,0.0002] 4,403,970 0.0024
PSI 10 Postop. Physio. and Metab. Derangement Y ‐0.0002 [‐0.0004,‐0.0000]** Y ‐0.0002 [‐0.0003,0.0000]* 2,200,834 0.0008
PSI 11 Postop. Respiratory Failure Y ‐0.0008 [‐0.0017,0.0001]* 0.0002 [‐0.0006,0.0010] 1,897,941 0.0058
PSI 12 Postop. Pul. Embolism or Deep Vein Thromb. Y ‐0.0010 [‐0.0017,‐0.0004]*** Y ‐0.0009 [‐0.0015,‐0.0004]*** 4,392,033 0.0068
PSI 13 Postoperative Sepsis Y ‐0.0023 [‐0.0036,‐0.0009]*** Y ‐0.0026 [‐0.0036,‐0.0016]*** 424,437 0.0053
PSI 14 Postoperative Would Dehiscence Y ‐0.0014 [‐0.0017,‐0.0010]*** Y ‐0.0015 [‐0.0019,‐0.0012]*** 939,696 0.0022
PSI 15 Accident. Puncture or Laceration, Provider Y ‐0.0007 [‐0.0009,‐0.0005]*** Y ‐0.0010 [‐0.0012,‐0.0008]*** 13,049,551 0.0034
PSI 17 Birth Trauma ‐ Injury to Neonate ‐0.0002 [‐0.0006,0.0003] 0.0001 [‐0.0003,0.0006] 3,976,866 0.0032
PSI 18 Ob. Trauma ‐ Vag. Deliv. with Instrument 0.0008 [‐0.0057,0.0073] N 0.0076 [0.0011,0.0140]** 236,512 0.1740
PSI 19 Ob. Trauma ‐ Vag. Deliv. without Instrument N 0.0026 [0.0010,0.0041]*** N 0.0022 [0.0006,0.0038]*** 2,463,695 0.0365
PSI 20 Obstetric Trauma ‐ Cesarean Delivery Y ‐0.0025 [‐0.0030,‐0.0019]*** Y ‐0.0025 [‐0.0030,‐0.0020]*** 1,248,050 0.0067
PSI 22 Iatrogenic Pneumothorax, Area Level 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0001] 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0001] 12,722,192 0.0007
PSI 23 Selected Infections Due to Medical Care, Area Y ‐0.0007 [‐0.0008,‐0.0005]*** Y ‐0.0007 [‐0.0009,‐0.0006]*** 15,515,612 0.0029
PSI 24 Postoperative Wound Dehiscence, Area Y ‐0.0001 [‐0.0002,‐0.0001]*** Y ‐0.0001 [‐0.0002,‐0.0001]*** 12,398,272 0.0003
PSI 25 Accidental Puncture or Laceration, Area Y ‐0.0008 [‐0.0009,‐0.0006]*** Y ‐0.0011 [‐0.0013,‐0.0009]*** 13,053,510 0.0038

















MA*After 0.0496 0.0126 ‐0.0306 0.0304 ‐0.0152 0.0168 ‐0.0136 0.0048
[0.0399, 0.0593]*** [0.0010, 0.0241]** [‐0.0395, ‐0.0216]*** [‐0.0144, 0.0752] [‐0.0357, 0.0052] [0.0015, 0.0320]** [‐0.0406, 0.0133] [‐0.0431, 0.0527]
MA*During 0.0137 0.0078 ‐0.0168 0.0704 0.0050 0.0071 ‐0.0277 ‐0.0331
[0.0012, 0.0262]** [‐0.0067, 0.0223] [‐0.0274, ‐0.0063]*** [0.0187, 0.1222]*** [‐0.0201, 0.0302] [‐0.0105, 0.0246] [‐0.0595, 0.0041] *[ ‐0.0908, 0.0246]
After 0.0065 0.0115 0.0115 0.0205 0.0175 0.1060 0.0317 0.0169
[0.0032, 0.0097]*** [0.0080, 0.0149]*** [0.0086, 0.0143]*** [0.0109, 0.0300]*** [0.0125, 0.0225]*** [0.1027, 0.1099]*** [0.0245, 0.0388]*** [0.0041, 0.0296]***
During 0.0060 0.0064 0.0002 0.0340 0.0112 0.0649 0.0214 0.0120
[0.0019, 0.0101]*** [0.0020, 0.0109]*** [‐0.0034, 0.0038] [0.0200, 0.0480]*** [0.0036, 0.0187]*** [0.0607, 0.0692]*** [0.0127, 0.0301]*** [‐0.0037, 0.0276]
MA 0.0814 0.0765 ‐0.0862 ‐0.1390 ‐0.0230 0.0204 0.1200 ‐0.0047
[0.0698, 0.0930]*** [0.0636, 0.0894]*** [‐0.0967, ‐0.0756]*** [‐0.1816, ‐0.0971]*** [‐0.0442, ‐0.0018]** [0.0049, 0.0359]*** [0.0923, 0.1471]*** [‐0.0528, 0.0434]
Constant 0.8200 0.7860 0.1720 0.7790 0.7130 0.2100 0.5980 0.6960
[0.8099, 0.8293]*** [0.7753, 0.7966]*** [0.1631, 0.1806]*** [0.7536, 0.8044]*** [0.6974, 0.7291]*** [0.1994, 0.2205]*** [0.5766, 0.6188]*** [0.6607, 0.7305]***
N (Nonelderly) 1,658,293 1,658,784 1,659,567 243,497 724,819 1,410,193 373,036 114,573
R Squared 0.018 0.021 0.008 0.016 0.008 0.017 0.006 0.005
MA Before 0.8877 0.8556 0.0937 0.6358 0.6960 0.2246 0.7155 0.6851
Non‐MA Before 0.8119 0.7651 0.1527 0.6820 0.6756 0.1988 0.6130 0.6461
MA After 0.9432 0.8796 0.0750 0.6897 0.6998 0.3452 0.7328 0.7061







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Costs, $Mill Log Total Costs Total Costs/LOS Total Costs/Disch.
MA* After 2006 9.544 ‐0.003 16.123 154.602
[‐4.669,23.758] [‐0.043,0.037] [‐32.972,65.218] [‐181.444,490.648]
N (All Ages) 3,869 3,869 3,869 3,869
Mean MA Before 2006 152.292 18.491 1,328.481 7,844.672
Mean Non‐MA Before 2006 121.030 18.178 1,318.436 7,451.341
Mean MA After 2006 230.174 18.798 1,629.457 9,576.684
Mean Non‐MA After 2006 152.690 18.381 1,557.693 8,728.628
MA*After 2006 Divided by Year to Investigate Dynamics
MA* 2008 22.441 ‐0.006 19.677 231.422
[3.310,41.572]** [‐0.043,0.032] [‐41.922,81.276] [‐199.535,662.380]
MA*2007 1.869 ‐0.001 14.008 108.884






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Uninsured Medicaid Private Medicare Other CommCare  Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
All Ages (100% of sample, including missing ages)
Ma*After ‐0.0153 0.0238 ‐0.0183 0.0039 0.0059 0.0076 ‐0.0626 0.0006 ‐0.0367
[‐0.0201,‐0.0104]*** [0.0161,0.0315]*** [‐0.0248,‐0.0119]*** [‐0.0003,0.0081]* [0.0010,0.0109]** [0.0076,0.0077]*** [‐0.1102,‐0.0150]** [‐0.0090,0.0103] [‐0.0585,‐0.0149]***
Mean MA Before 0.0409 0.1536 0.3693 0.4214 0.0148 0.0000 5.8833 1.5099 0.4789
Nonelderly (age<65) (66% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0231 0.0389 ‐0.0306 0.0042 0.0106 0.0124 ‐0.0504 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0202
[‐0.0300,‐0.0162]*** [0.0265,0.0512]*** [‐0.0378,‐0.0233]*** [0.0013,0.0070]*** [0.0041,0.0171]*** [0.0123,0.0124]*** [‐0.0999,‐0.0008]** [‐0.0111,0.0086] [‐0.0397,‐0.0007]**
Mean MA Before 0.0643 0.2460 0.5631 0.1073 0.0193 0.0000 5.4256 1.4267 0.3868
Elderly (age 65+) (34% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0016 0.0020 ‐0.0015 0.0021 ‐0.0011 0.0001 ‐0.0640 0.0049 ‐0.0675
[‐0.0025,‐0.0006]*** [0.0006,0.0034]*** [‐0.0122,0.0092] [‐0.0098,0.0140] [‐0.0054,0.0033] [0.0001,0.0001]*** [‐0.1211,‐0.0070]** [‐0.0049,0.0148] [‐0.0951,‐0.0398]***
Mean MA Before 0.0045 0.0096 0.0671 0.9112 0.0076 0.0000 6.5975 1.6396 0.6226
Age<19 (18% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0154 0.0720 ‐0.0575 ‐0.0010 0.0019 0.0026 ‐0.0672 ‐0.0024 0.0192
[‐0.0361,0.0053] [0.0454,0.0987]*** [‐0.0680,‐0.0470]*** [‐0.0050,0.0029] [‐0.0025,0.0062] [0.0026,0.0026]*** [‐0.1192,‐0.0153]** [‐0.0104,0.0056] [0.0132,0.0252]***
Mean MA Before 0.0199 0.3122 0.6515 0.0004 0.0160 0.0000 5.2987 1.3623 0.1287
Age 19‐26 (7% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0407 0.0449 ‐0.0210 0.0013 0.0155 0.0204 ‐0.0134 0.0008 ‐0.0252
[‐0.0491,‐0.0323]*** [0.0297,0.0600]*** [‐0.0306,‐0.0113]*** [‐0.0034,0.0061] [0.0092,0.0218]*** [0.0204,0.0205]*** [‐0.0646,0.0377] [‐0.0079,0.0096] [‐0.0423,‐0.0082]***
Mean MA Before 0.1266 0.4298 0.3880 0.0339 0.0216 0.0000 4.6897 1.3344 0.3859
Age 27‐30 (4% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0221 0.0433 ‐0.0372 0.0019 0.0141 0.0137 0.0899 0.0103 ‐0.0209
[‐0.0302,‐0.0139]*** [0.0272,0.0593]*** [‐0.0461,‐0.0283]*** [‐0.0025,0.0062] [0.0074,0.0208]*** [0.0136,0.0137]*** [0.0376,0.1423]*** [0.0022,0.0184]** [‐0.0366,‐0.0051]**
Mean MA Before 0.0825 0.2659 0.5805 0.0519 0.0192 0.0000 4.5374 1.3464 0.3144
Age 31‐40 (10% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0304 0.0313 ‐0.0130 0.0026 0.0095 0.0121 ‐0.1187 ‐0.0041 ‐0.0240
[‐0.0374,‐0.0234]*** [0.0215,0.0411]*** [‐0.0206,‐0.0054]*** [‐0.0016,0.0068] [0.0012,0.0179]** [0.0120,0.0122]*** [‐0.1819,‐0.0555]*** [‐0.0142,0.0060] [‐0.0459,‐0.0021]**
Mean MA Before 0.0841 0.2118 0.5962 0.0883 0.0196 0.0000 4.8814 1.3839 0.3914
Age 41‐54 (15% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0283 0.0230 ‐0.0247 0.0155 0.0146 0.0163 0.0504 0.0068 ‐0.0513
[‐0.0377,‐0.0189]*** [0.0154,0.0306]*** [‐0.0323,‐0.0171]*** [0.0119,0.0191]*** [0.0055,0.0237]*** [0.0162,0.0163]*** [‐0.0104,0.1111] [‐0.0057,0.0194] [‐0.0830,‐0.0195]***
Mean MA Before 0.0855 0.1975 0.5110 0.1842 0.0220 0.0000 5.7564 1.4839 0.5807
Age 55‐64 (12% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0120 0.0181 ‐0.0145 ‐0.0036 0.0120 0.0147 ‐0.1480 ‐0.0090 ‐0.0462
[‐0.0176,‐0.0063]*** [0.0110,0.0251]*** [‐0.0221,‐0.0069]*** [‐0.0074,0.0001]* [0.0049,0.0192]*** [0.0146,0.0147]*** [‐0.2012,‐0.0948]*** [‐0.0213,0.0034] [‐0.0759,‐0.0166]***
Mean MA Before 0.0512 0.1344 0.5511 0.2436 0.0197 0.0000 6.3052 1.5602 0.5541
Age 65‐74 (13% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0028 0.0017 ‐0.0006 0.0048 ‐0.0031 0.0001 ‐0.0136 0.0086 ‐0.0572
[‐0.0040,‐0.0017]*** [‐0.0001,0.0035]* [‐0.0131,0.0119] [‐0.0095,0.0190] [‐0.0084,0.0023] [0.0001,0.0001]*** [‐0.0623,0.0351] [‐0.0018,0.0189] [‐0.0844,‐0.0300]***
Mean MA Before 0.0078 0.0174 0.1131 0.8518 0.0099 0.0000 6.4894 1.6001 0.5693
Age 75+ (21% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0009 0.0022 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 ‐0.0833 0.0038 ‐0.0733
[‐0.0018,‐0.0000]** [0.0010,0.0034]*** [‐0.0108,0.0087] [‐0.0109,0.0103] [‐0.0037,0.0039] [0.0000,0.0000]*** [‐0.1530,‐0.0136]** [‐0.0057,0.0133] [‐0.1016,‐0.0451]***






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Uninsured Medicaid Private Medicare Other CommCare Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
Female (59% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0182 0.0399 ‐0.0357 0.0046 0.0095 0.0109 0.0035 0.0046 ‐0.0147
[‐0.0256,‐0.0108]*** [0.0264,0.0534]*** [‐0.0426,‐0.0288]*** [0.0014,0.0079]*** [0.0040,0.0149]*** [0.0109,0.0110]*** [‐0.0398,0.0468] [‐0.0038,0.0129] [‐0.0320,0.0026]*
Mean MA Before 0.0443 0.2707 0.5814 0.0905 0.0131 0.0000 5.1450 1.4050 0.3320
Male (41% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0300 0.0381 ‐0.0238 0.0035 0.0122 0.0143 ‐0.1277 ‐0.0095 ‐0.0282
[‐0.0374,‐0.0226]*** [0.0273,0.0490]*** [‐0.0319,‐0.0158]*** [0.0010,0.0059]*** [0.0040,0.0204]*** [0.0143,0.0144]*** [‐0.1893,‐0.0662]*** [‐0.0216,0.0027] [‐0.0513,‐0.0051]**
Mean MA Before 0.0908 0.2133 0.5388 0.1297 0.0360 0.0165 5.7970 1.4555 0.4595
Patient's Zip Code in First (Lowest) Income Quartile (28% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0359 0.1050 ‐0.0899 0.0059 0.0148 0.0130 0.0535 0.0158 ‐0.0570
[‐0.0440,‐0.0277]*** [0.0873,0.1227]*** [‐0.1004,‐0.0793]*** [0.0025,0.0093]*** [0.0035,0.0260]** [0.0130,0.0130]*** [‐0.0050,0.1119]* [0.0071,0.0244]*** [‐0.0703,‐0.0436]***
Mean MA Before 0.0643 0.2460 0.5631 0.1073 0.0193 0.0000 5.6074 1.4402 0.4665
Patient's Zip Code in Second Income Quartile (26% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0226 0.0447 ‐0.0495 0.0148 0.0126 0.0165 ‐0.0941 ‐0.0081 ‐0.0190
[‐0.0309,‐0.0143]*** [0.0305,0.0590]*** [‐0.0595,‐0.0396]*** [0.0113,0.0184]*** [0.0053,0.0199]*** [0.0164,0.0165]*** [‐0.1310,‐0.0572]*** [‐0.0153,‐0.0009]** [‐0.0297,‐0.0083]***
Mean MA Before 0.0643 0.2460 0.5631 0.1073 0.0193 0.0000 5.5681 1.4451 0.4437
Patient's Zip Code in Third Income Quartile (23% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0234 0.0217 ‐0.0106 0.0020 0.0103 0.0130 ‐0.0890 0.0017 ‐0.0107
[‐0.0295,‐0.0174]*** [0.0098,0.0336]*** [‐0.0187,‐0.0026]** [‐0.0010,0.0050] [0.0069,0.0138]*** [0.0130,0.0130]*** [‐0.1417,‐0.0363]*** [‐0.0061,0.0095] [‐0.0392,0.0178]
Mean MA Before 0.0643 0.2460 0.5631 0.1073 0.0193 0.0000 5.3885 1.4240 0.3671
Patient's Zip Code in Fourth (Highest) Income Quartile (21% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0059 0.0006 0.0010 ‐0.0007 0.0050 0.0090 ‐0.0911 ‐0.0185 0.0098
[‐0.0159,0.0042] [‐0.0080,0.0093] [‐0.0116,0.0135] [‐0.0066,0.0051] [0.0011,0.0089]** [0.0090,0.0090]*** [‐0.1957,0.0136]* [‐0.0478,0.0108] [‐0.0324,0.0519]







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Uninsured Medicaid Private Medicare Other CommCare  Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
White (45% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0156 0.0192 ‐0.0193 0.0071 0.0086 0.0125 ‐0.0665 ‐0.0050 ‐0.0234
[‐0.0218,‐0.0095]*** [0.0105,0.0279]*** [‐0.0266,‐0.0121]*** [0.0042,0.0101]*** [0.0053,0.0120]*** [0.0124,0.0126]*** [‐0.1282,‐0.0048]** [‐0.0191,0.0091] [‐0.0480,0.0011]*
Mean MA Before 0.0524 0.1647 0.6475 0.1147 0.0207 0.0000 5.3834 1.4270 0.3786
Black (12% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0287 0.0616 ‐0.0474 0.0043 0.0103 0.0138 0.1013 0.0107 ‐0.0019
[‐0.0383,‐0.0192]*** [0.0476,0.0755]*** [‐0.0573,‐0.0375]*** [‐0.0032,0.0118] [0.0026,0.0179]*** [0.0138,0.0139]*** [0.0163,0.1862]** [‐0.0026,0.0240] [‐0.0516,0.0477]
Mean MA Before 0.1012 0.4469 0.3008 0.1363 0.0149 0.0000 5.9492 1.4840 0.5226
Hispanic (12% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0491 0.1058 ‐0.0627 ‐0.0002 0.0062 0.0122 0.0203 0.0023 ‐0.0200
[‐0.0943,‐0.0039]** [0.0476,0.1639]*** [‐0.0756,‐0.0498]*** [‐0.0054,0.0051] [‐0.0036,0.0160] [0.0121,0.0122]*** [‐0.0368,0.0774] [‐0.0091,0.0138] [‐0.0320,‐0.0079]***
Mean MA Before 0.0903 0.5390 0.2773 0.0801 0.0134 0.0000 5.1288 1.3786 0.4179
Asian (2% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0223 ‐0.0175 0.0222 0.0025 0.0152 0.0141 0.1930 0.0289 0.0037
[‐0.0300,‐0.0147]*** [‐0.0275,‐0.0075]*** [0.0125,0.0319]*** [‐0.0020,0.0070] [0.0091,0.0213]*** [0.0141,0.0142]*** [0.0706,0.3153]*** [0.0128,0.0451]*** [‐0.0068,0.0143]
Mean MA Before 0.0661 0.2911 0.6070 0.0250 0.0109 0.0000 5.0414 1.3643 0.2626
Native American (1% of sample)
MA*After 0.0042 0.0542 0.0694 ‐0.0538 ‐0.0739 ‐0.0009 0.4699 0.0201 ‐0.0905
[‐0.0091,0.0175] [0.0211,0.0872]*** [0.0538,0.0850]*** [‐0.0630,‐0.0447]*** [‐0.1255,‐0.0223]*** [‐0.0009,‐0.0009]*** [0.1538,0.7860]*** [‐0.0033,0.0436]* [‐0.1333,‐0.0478]***
Mean MA Before 0.0514 0.3330 0.4700 0.1305 0.0152 0.0000 5.3411 1.4772 0.2774
Other Race (3% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0248 0.0048 0.0032 ‐0.0017 0.0185 0.0146 ‐0.1673 ‐0.0212 ‐0.0260
[‐0.0454,‐0.0041]** [‐0.0054,0.0149] [‐0.0154,0.0218] [‐0.0087,0.0053] [0.0103,0.0267]*** [0.0143,0.0148]*** [‐0.3827,0.0480] [‐0.0563,0.0138] [‐0.0421,‐0.0100]***
Mean MA Before 0.1107 0.3108 0.5238 0.0331 0.0217 0.0000 5.7428 1.4287 0.2211
Unknown Race (25% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0430 0.0657 0.0120 ‐0.0098 ‐0.0250 0.0095 ‐0.5677 ‐0.0246 ‐0.0951
[‐0.0590,‐0.0269]*** [0.0536,0.0779]*** [‐0.0066,0.0305] [‐0.0145,‐0.0050]*** [‐0.0336,‐0.0164]*** [0.0095,0.0095]*** [‐0.6256,‐0.5098]*** [‐0.0347,‐0.0146]*** [‐0.1065,‐0.0836]***










Employment Medicaid Medicare VA/Military
MA*After ‐0.0571 0.0345 ‐0.0086 0.0351 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0036
[‐0.0605,‐0.0537]*** [0.0283,0.0408]*** [‐0.0106,‐0.0066]*** [0.0317,0.0386]*** [‐0.0012,0.0004] [‐0.0050,‐0.0023]***
[‐0.0604,‐0.0536]+++  [0.0286,0.0403]+++ [‐0.0105,‐0.0066]+++ [0.0317,0.0385]+++ [‐0.0011,0.0004]+ [‐0.0051,‐0.0025]+++
MA*During ‐0.0049 0.0024 0.0066 ‐0.0005 0.0011 ‐0.0047
[‐0.0093,‐0.0005]** [‐0.0016,0.0064] [0.0036,0.0096]*** [‐0.0036,0.0025] [0.0004,0.0019]*** [‐0.0061,‐0.0034]***
[‐0.0097,‐0.0005]++ [‐0.0020,0.0060] [0.0041,0.0102]+++ [‐0.0036,0.0022] [0.0004,0.0019]+++ [‐0.006,‐0.0032]+++
After 0.0007 ‐0.0134 ‐0.0006 0.0101 0.0023 0.0009
[‐0.0027,0.0042] [‐0.0197,‐0.0072]*** [‐0.0026,0.0015] [0.0066,0.0136]*** [0.0015,0.0031]*** [‐0.0004,0.0022]
[‐0.0027,0.0037]+ [‐0.0192,‐0.0077] [‐0.0025,0.0013]+ [0.0068,0.0135]+++ [0.0016,0.003]+++ [‐0.0003,0.0023]+
During 0.0058 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0004 0.0023 0.0010 ‐0.0009
[0.0014,0.0101]** [‐0.0117,‐0.0037]*** [‐0.0034,0.0025] [‐0.0008,0.0053] [0.0002,0.0018]** [‐0.0022,0.0004]
[0.0015,0.0105]+++ [‐0.0113,‐0.0033]+++ [‐0.0039,0.0020]+ [‐0.0004,0.0053] [0.0003,0.0018]+++ [‐0.0024,0.0003]+  
MA ‐0.0335 0.0513 0.0075 ‐0.0082 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0056
[‐0.0352,‐0.0319]*** [0.0490,0.0536]*** [0.0067,0.0083]*** [‐0.0098,‐0.0067]*** [‐0.0118,‐0.0111]*** [‐0.0061,‐0.0051]***
[‐0.0718,0.0013]+ [0.0144,0.1127]+ [‐0.0606,0.0084]+ [‐0.0683,0.0444] [‐0.0117,0.0016]+ [‐0.0633,0.0012]+
Constant 0.1511 0.6531 0.0459 0.1195 0.0172 0.0132
[0.1494,0.1527]*** [0.6508,0.6555]*** [0.0450,0.0467]*** [0.1180,0.1210]*** [0.0169,0.0175]*** [0.0127,0.0137]***
[0.1164,0.1889]+++ [0.5922,0.6898]+++ [0.0449,0.1138]+++ [0.067,0.1796]+++  [0.0041,0.0175]+++ [0.0065,0.0708]+++ 
N (Nonelderly) 1,129,221 1,129,221 1,129,221 1,129,221 1,129,221 1,129,221
R Squared 0.0152 0.0160 0.0030 0.0071 0.0013 0.0066
MA Before 0.1176 0.7044 0.0534 0.1113 0.0057 0.0076
Non‐MA Before 0.1732 0.6358 0.0607 0.1066 0.0090 0.0147
MA After 0.0612 0.7255 0.0442 0.1565 0.0077 0.0049







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uninsured ESHI Medicaid Medicare Military Private
Age<19 (32% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0351 0.0210 0.0416 ‐0.0002 ‐0.0046 ‐0.0227
[‐0.0518,‐0.0183]*** [‐0.0223,0.0644] [0.0047,0.0784]** [‐0.0018,0.0013] [‐0.0070,‐0.0022]*** [‐0.0380,‐0.0074]***
Mean MA Before 0.0728 0.7116 0.1587 0.0006 0.0055 0.0508
Age 19‐26 (9% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.1410 0.1000 0.0454 0.0011 0.0037 ‐0.0091
[‐0.1622,‐0.1198]*** [0.0585,0.1415]*** [0.0086,0.0823]** [‐0.0015,0.0037] [‐0.0038,0.0111] [‐0.0320,0.0137]
Mean MA Before 0.2654 0.5321 0.0977 0.0000 0.0018 0.1030
Age 27‐30 (5% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.1662 0.1269 0.0329 0.0085 ‐0.0026 0.0006
[‐0.1927,‐0.1397]*** [0.0859,0.1679]*** [0.0195,0.0463]*** [0.0063,0.0107]*** [‐0.0063,0.0010] [‐0.0459,0.0471]
Mean MA Before 0.2691 0.5984 0.0934 0.0000 0.0019 0.0372
Age 31‐40 (14% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0711 0.0372 0.0506 0.0066 ‐0.0038 ‐0.0195
[‐0.1039,‐0.0382]*** [0.0084,0.0659]** [0.0305,0.0708]*** [‐0.0079,0.0211] [‐0.0067,‐0.0010]*** [‐0.0372,‐0.0018]**
Mean MA Before 0.1417 0.7050 0.0959 0.0032 0.0049 0.0492
Age 41‐54 (21% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0424 0.0129 0.0295 0.0006 ‐0.0029 0.0023
[‐0.0649,‐0.0198]*** [‐0.0360,0.0618] [0.0058,0.0531]** [‐0.0071,0.0084] [‐0.0055,‐0.0003]** [‐0.0096,0.0141]
Mean MA Before 0.0872 0.7693 0.0857 0.0041 0.0074 0.0464
Age 55‐64 (9% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0408 0.0292 0.0396 ‐0.0123 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0042
[‐0.0541,‐0.0276]*** [‐0.0428,0.1012] [0.0101,0.0690]*** [‐0.0302,0.0056] [‐0.0151,‐0.0078]*** [‐0.0312,0.0228]
Mean MA Before 0.0806 0.7594 0.0525 0.0298 0.0243 0.0534
Age 65‐74 (5% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0150 0.0734 0.0343 ‐0.0665 0.0165 ‐0.0427
[‐0.0040,‐0.0259]*** [0.0011,0.1458]** [0.0175,0.0511]*** [‐0.1340,0.0009]* [‐0.0172,0.0503] [‐0.1280,0.0426]
Mean MA Before 0.0159 0.3945 0.0565 0.2466 0.0144 0.2721
Age 75+ (4% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0071 0.0798 0.0065 ‐0.0028 ‐0.0025 ‐0.0092
[‐0.0096,‐0.0046]*** [0.0180,0.1416]** [‐0.0171,0.0300] [‐0.0044,‐0.0011]*** [‐0.0055,0.0005] [‐0.0274,0.0090]





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uninsured ESHI Medicaid Medicare Military Private
Female (51% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0547 0.0284 0.0419 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0128
[‐0.0720,‐0.0374]*** [0.0008,0.0560]** [0.0233,0.0605]*** [‐0.0045,0.0026] [‐0.0032,‐0.0005]*** [‐0.0212,‐0.0043]***
Mean MA Before 0.0937 0.6496 0.1037 0.0513 0.0059 0.0958
Male (49% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0719 0.0476 0.0367 0.0014 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0081
[‐0.0787,‐0.0652]*** [0.0081,0.0871]** [0.0156,0.0579]*** [‐0.0005,0.0033] [‐0.0081,‐0.0034]*** [‐0.0298,0.0137]
Mean MA Before 0.1274 0.6713 0.0950 0.0303 0.0098 0.0663
Patient's Zip Code in First (Lowest) Income Quartile (15% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.1232 ‐0.0206 0.1396 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0043 0.0092
[‐0.1612,‐0.0852]*** [‐0.0440,0.0027]* [0.1172,0.1620]*** [‐0.0178,0.0165] [‐0.0090,0.0004]* [‐0.0375,0.0559]
Mean MA Before 0.2188 0.2154 0.4621 0.0205 0.0086 0.0746
Patient's Zip Code in Second Income Quartile (22% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.1222 0.0635 0.0595 0.0059 0.0087 ‐0.0155
[‐0.1917,‐0.0526]*** [‐0.0203,0.1473] [0.0231,0.0959]*** [0.0022,0.0097]*** [‐0.0070,0.0245] [‐0.0457,0.0148]
Mean MA Before 0.2108 0.5354 0.1600 0.0039 0.0051 0.0848
Patient's Zip Code in Third Income Quartile (29% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0796 0.0777 0.0067 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0100 0.0078
[‐0.0912,‐0.0679]*** [0.0400,0.1154]*** [‐0.0146,0.0281] [‐0.0111,0.0059] [‐0.0141,‐0.0060]*** [‐0.0195,0.0351]
Mean MA Before 0.1410 0.7130 0.0778 0.0053 0.0122 0.0507
Patient's Zip Code in Fourth Income Quartile (33% of sample)
Ma*After ‐0.0160 0.0334 0.0109 0.0007 ‐0.0043 ‐0.0247
[‐0.0214,‐0.0107]*** [0.0062,0.0606]** [‐0.0020,0.0238]* [‐0.0007,0.0021] [‐0.0075,‐0.0010]** [‐0.0364,‐0.0131]***





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uninsured ESHI Medicaid Medicare Military Private
White (78% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0568 0.0473 0.0261 0.0002 ‐0.0047 ‐0.0121
[‐0.0691,‐0.0444]*** [0.0120,0.0827]*** [0.0000,0.0522]** [‐0.0026,0.0030] [‐0.0065,‐0.0029]*** [‐0.0224,‐0.0019]**
Mean MA Before 0.1149 0.7190 0.0963 0.0049 0.0078 0.0571
Black (11% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.1493 ‐0.0094 0.1636 ‐0.0079 0.0085 ‐0.0056
[‐0.1774,‐0.1213]*** [‐0.0484,0.0296] [0.1170,0.2103]*** [‐0.0138,‐0.0019]** [0.0036,0.0134]*** [‐0.0551,0.0440]
Mean MA Before 0.2045 0.5402 0.2080 0.0102 0.0000 0.0371
Hispanic (11% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.3239 0.4516 ‐0.1174 ‐0.0007 ‐0.0029 ‐0.0067
[‐0.6683,0.0205]* [0.3552,0.5479]*** [‐0.4071,0.1724] [‐0.0023,0.0009] [‐0.0053,‐0.0005]** [‐0.0627,0.0493]
Mean MA Before 0.4027 0.2030 0.3661 0.0000 0.0000 0.0283
Asian (4% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.0754 ‐0.0029 0.0630 0.0122 ‐0.0080 0.0111
[‐0.0999,‐0.0508]*** [‐0.0606,0.0549] [0.0277,0.0983]*** [0.0061,0.0182]*** [‐0.0142,‐0.0019]** [‐0.0373,0.0595]
Mean MA Before 0.1796 0.6308 0.1275 0.0027 0.0113 0.0481
Native American (1% of sample)
MA*After ‐0.1316 ‐0.1769 0.3094 ‐0.0008 0.0025 ‐0.0026
[‐0.2802,0.0170]* [‐0.4387,0.0849] [‐0.0859,0.7047] [‐0.0084,0.0068] [‐0.0082,0.0131] [‐0.0159,0.0107]





(1) (preferred) (2) (covariates) (2) (covariates cont.) (2) (covariates cont.) (2) (covariates cont.)
Dependent Variable Uninsured Uninsured
Ma*After ‐0.0231 ‐0.0228 Female ‐0.0394 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0220 Charlson 6 0.0255
[‐0.0300,‐0.0162]*** [‐0.0297,‐0.0158]*** [‐0.0453,‐0.0336]*** cm_dmcx [‐0.0279,‐0.0161]*** [0.0201,0.0308]***
MA*During ‐0.0129 ‐0.0131 Gender Unknown ‐0.0058 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0720 Charlson 7 0.0086
[‐0.0176,‐0.0083]*** [‐0.0177,‐0.0085]*** [‐0.0256,0.0139] cm_drug [0.0506,0.0933]*** [0.0047,0.0124]***
2004 Q2 0.0041 0.0036 Black 0.0067 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0009 Charlson 8 ‐0.0333
[0.0025,0.0058]*** [0.0022,0.0050]*** [0.0019,0.0115]*** cm_htn_c [‐0.0028,0.0010] [‐0.0407,‐0.0258]***
2004 Q3 0.0044 0.0037 Hispanic 0.0362 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0115 Charlson 9 0.0063
[0.0024,0.0065]*** [0.0018,0.0056]*** [0.0159,0.0565]*** cm_hypothy [‐0.0142,‐0.0087]*** [0.0020,0.0107]***
2004 Q4 0.0038 0.0037 Asian 0.0187 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0044 Charlson 10 0.0558
[0.0011,0.0065]*** [0.0010,0.0064]*** [0.0134,0.0240]*** cm_liver [0.0004,0.0084]** [0.0427,0.0689]***
2005 Q1 0.0020 0.0025 Native American 0.0008 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0332 Charlson 11 0.0130
[‐0.0034,0.0074] [‐0.0027,0.0077] [‐0.0120,0.0137] cm_lymph [‐0.0408,‐0.0256]*** [0.0071,0.0189]***
2005 Q2 0.0059 0.0062 Other Race 0.0353 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0245 Charlson 12 ‐0.0036
[‐0.0004,0.0121]* [0.0002,0.0122]** [0.0167,0.0539]*** cm_lytes [0.0203,0.0287]*** [‐0.0060,‐0.0012]***
2005 Q3 0.0112 0.0109 Unknown Race 0.0084 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0244 Charlson 13 ‐0.0193
[0.0037,0.0187]*** [0.0036,0.0182]*** [‐0.0043,0.0211] cm_mets [‐0.0293,‐0.0195]*** [‐0.0244,‐0.0142]***
2005 Q4 0.0093 0.0102 0.0220 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0144 Charlson 14 ‐0.0066
[0.0024,0.0162]*** [0.0034,0.0170]*** [0.0149,0.0291]*** cm_neuro [‐0.0176,‐0.0111]*** [‐0.0111,‐0.0021]***
2006 Q1 0.0079 0.0095 0.0170 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0027 Charlson 15 0.0248
[‐0.0005,0.0163]* [0.0013,0.0176]** [0.0107,0.0234]*** cm_obese [0.0002,0.0053]** [0.0188,0.0309]***
2006 Q2 0.0107 0.0118 0.0092 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0439 Charlson 16 0.0582
[0.0019,0.0195]** [0.0033,0.0203]*** [0.0048,0.0137]*** cm_para [‐0.0529,‐0.0349]*** [0.0479,0.0686]***
2006 Q3 0.0146 0.0157 0.0470 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0140 Charlson 17 ‐0.0008
[0.0054,0.0237]*** [0.0067,0.0247]*** [0.0138,0.0802]*** cm_perivasc [‐0.0176,‐0.0105]*** [‐0.0043,0.0028]
2006 Q4 Age 0.0039 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0061 Charlson 18 ‐0.0353
[0.0030,0.0048]*** cm_psych [‐0.0105,‐0.0018]*** [‐0.0488,‐0.0219]***
2007 Q1 0.0109 0.0132 Age Squared ‐0.0001 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0043 Diagnosis count ‐0.0047
[0.0030,0.0189]*** [0.0055,0.0210]*** [‐0.0001,‐0.0000]*** cm_pulmcirc [‐0.0069,‐0.0016]*** [‐0.0057,‐0.0038]***
2007 Q2 0.0151 0.0170 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0296 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0430 APRDRG 0.0044
[0.0061,0.0241]*** [0.0082,0.0258]*** cm_aids [‐0.0385,‐0.0207]*** cm_renlfail [‐0.0535,‐0.0325]*** Risk mortality [0.0034,0.0054]***
2007 Q3 0.0145 0.0161 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0901 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0283 APRDRG 0.0013
[0.0049,0.0241]*** [0.0064,0.0258]*** cm_alcohol [0.0725,0.1077]*** cm_tumor [‐0.0334,‐0.0231]*** Severity [‐0.0005,0.0030]
2007 Q4 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0063 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0489 APSDRG 0.0014
cm_anemdef [0.0038,0.0089]*** cm_ulcer [‐0.0573,‐0.0405]*** Mortality Weight [0.0009,0.0019]***
2008 Q1 0.0120 0.0154 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0191 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0042 APSDRG 0.0043
[0.0018,0.0222]** [0.0052,0.0256]*** cm_arth [‐0.0251,‐0.0131]*** cm_valve [‐0.0066,‐0.0017]*** LOS Weight [0.0004,0.0083]**
2008 Q2 0.0131 0.0162 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0188 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0072 APSDRG ‐0.0056
[0.0033,0.0230]** [0.0063,0.0262]*** cm_bldloss [‐0.0244,‐0.0133]*** cm_wghtloss [0.0037,0.0107]*** Charge Weight [‐0.0083,‐0.0028]***
2008 Q3 0.0181 0.0210 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0316 Charlson 1 0.0422
[0.0060,0.0303]*** [0.0088,0.0332]*** cm_chf [‐0.0386,‐0.0246]*** [0.0331,0.0512]***
2008 Q4 0.0164 0.0202 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0157 Charlson 2 0.0086
[0.0055,0.0273]*** [0.0092,0.0313]*** cm_chrnlung [‐0.0195,‐0.0119]*** [0.0058,0.0115]***
Constant 0.0708 0.0373 AHRQ Comorb. 0.0090 Charlson 3 0.0205
[0.0645,0.0772]*** [0.0196,0.0551]*** cm_coag [0.0070,0.0110]*** [0.0139,0.0271]***
Hospital Indicators Yes Yes AHRQ Comorb. 0.0016 Charlson 4 0.0001
Covariates No Yes, cont. next cols. cm_depress [‐0.0007,0.0039] [‐0.0021,0.0023]
N (Nonelderly) 23,860,930 23,860,930 AHRQ Comorb. ‐0.0570 Charlson 5 ‐0.0094














Inpatient Quality Indicators Improvement? MA* After Improvement? MA* After, Risk Adjusted N, Mean MA Before
IQI 1 Esophageal Resection Volume 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0000] N 0.0000 [0.0000,0.0000]** 23,847,297 0.0002
IQI 2 Pancreatic Resection Volume Y ‐0.0001 [‐0.0001,‐0.0000]*** N 0.0000 [‐0.0001,‐0.0000]*** 23,847,297 0.0002
IQI 4 AAA Repair Volume 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0000] 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0000] 23,847,297 0.0004
IQI 6 Percut. Transluminal Cor. Angioplasty, Volume Y ‐0.0010 [‐0.0019,‐0.0002]** ‐0.0006 [‐0.0013,0.0001] 23,847,297 0.0162
IQI 7 Carotid  Endarterectomy, Volume Y ‐0.0001 [‐0.0002,‐0.0000]*** Y ‐0.0002 [‐0.0002,‐0.0001]*** 23,847,297 0.0013
IQI 8 Esophageal Resection Mortality ‐0.0010 [‐0.1050,0.1031] ‐0.0065 [‐0.1066,0.0936] 953 0.0357
IQI 9 Pancreatic Resection Mortality 0.0252 [‐0.0196,0.0701] 0.0249 [‐0.0219,0.0716] 2,327 0.0257
IQI 11 AAA Repair Mortality Y ‐0.0331 [‐0.0516,‐0.0146]*** Y ‐0.0305 [‐0.0477,‐0.0133]*** 6,580 0.0731
IQI 12 CABG Mortality 0.0014 [‐0.0017,0.0045] N 0.0040 [0.0006,0.0073]** 108,373 0.0132
IQI 13 Craniotomy Mortality Y ‐0.0107 [‐0.0183,‐0.0031]*** Y ‐0.0078 [‐0.0159,0.0003]* 66,356 0.0423
IQI 14 Hip Replacement Mortality ‐0.0004 [‐0.0010,0.0003] ‐0.0001 [‐0.0008,0.0006] 89,199 0.0000
IQI 15 AMI Mortality N 0.0131 [0.0104,0.0158]*** N 0.0135 [0.0114,0.0157]*** 216,870 0.0210
IQI 16 Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) Mortality N 0.0037 [0.0024,0.0050]*** N 0.0040 [0.0025,0.0054]*** 269,453 0.0162
IQI 17 Acute Stroke Mortality 0.0014 [‐0.0031,0.0058] N 0.0153 [0.0104,0.0202]*** 149,772 0.0813
IQI 18 Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage Mortality N 0.0029 [0.0004,0.0054]** 0.0008 [‐0.0016,0.0033] 159,381 0.0133
IQI 20 Pneumonia Mortality N 0.0021 [0.0001,0.0041]** N 0.0040 [0.0023,0.0057]*** 328,652 0.0221
IQI 21 Cesarean Delivery Rate N 0.0078 [0.0037,0.0120]*** Y ‐0.0024 [‐0.0044,‐0.0003]** 3,477,744 0.2653
IQI 22 VBAC Rate Uncomplicated Y ‐0.0107 [‐0.0186,‐0.0027]*** N 0.0061 [0.0021,0.0101]*** 515,576 0.1397
IQI 23 Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy Rate Y ‐0.0362 [‐0.0452,‐0.0273]*** Y ‐0.0401 [‐0.0503,‐0.0298]*** 219,424 0.8138
IQI 25 Bilateral Cardiac Catheterization Rate Y ‐0.0380 [‐0.0416,‐0.0344]*** Y ‐0.0372 [‐0.0407,‐0.0338]*** 568,498 0.1372
IQI 26 CABG Area Rate Y ‐0.0003 [‐0.0005,0.0000]* 0.0000 [‐0.0003,0.0002] 23,847,297 0.0043
IQI 27 PCTA Area Rate Y ‐0.0009 [‐0.0017,‐0.0001]** ‐0.0005 [‐0.0011,0.0002] 23,847,297 0.0155
IQI 28 Hysterectomy Area Rate 0.0003 [‐0.0007,0.0012] ‐0.0005 [‐0.0013,0.0004] 23,847,297 0.0147
IQI 29 Laminectomy or Spinal Fusion Area Rate Y ‐0.0005 [‐0.0009,‐0.0001]** 0.0002 [‐0.0003,0.0008] 23,847,297 0.0145
IQI 30 Percut. Transluminal Cor. Angioplasty, Mort. 0.0042 [0.0030,0.0053]*** N 0.0046 [0.0035,0.0058]*** 345,200 0.0062
IQI 31 Carotid Endarterectomy, Mortality Y ‐0.0026 [‐0.0044,‐0.0008]*** Y ‐0.0023 [‐0.0046,0.0000]* 27,336 0.0037
IQI 32 AMI Mortality WO Transfer N 0.0148 [0.0110,0.0187]*** N 0.0118 [0.0086,0.0149]*** 142,418 0.0267
IQI 33 Primary Cesarean Delivery Rate N 0.0095 [0.0058,0.0132]*** Y ‐0.0017 [‐0.0036,0.0001]* 2,962,168 0.1710
IQI 34 VBAC Rate All Y ‐0.0089 [‐0.0169,‐0.0009]** 0.0012 [‐0.0033,0.0057] 588,227 0.1350
Pediatric Quality Indicators
PDI 90 Overall PDI N 0.0048 [0.0033,0.0062]*** 0.0003 [‐0.0008,0.0014] 3,085,305 0.0228
PDI 91 Acute PDI N 0.0007 [0.0000,0.0013]** 0.0000 [‐0.0006,0.0005] 3,085,305 0.0077
PDI 92 Chronic PDI N 0.0041 [0.0030,0.0052]*** 0.0003 [‐0.0004,0.0011] 3,085,305 0.0151
PDI 1 Accidental Puncture or Laceration Y ‐0.0003 [‐0.0004,‐0.0001]*** Y ‐0.0003 [‐0.0004,‐0.0001]*** 3,085,305 0.0014
PDI 2 Pressure Ulcer N 0.0011 [0.0002,0.0021]** N 0.0007 [‐0.0001,0.0016]* 319,153 0.0027
PDI 5 Iatrogenic Pneumothorax 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0001] 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0001] 2,768,569 0.0003
PDI 6 Pediatric Heart Surgery Mortality Y ‐0.0473 [‐0.0623,‐0.0323]*** Y ‐0.0706 [‐0.0819,‐0.0593]*** 19,902 0.0301
PDI 7 Pediatric Heart Surgery Volume 0.0001 [‐0.0004,0.0007] 0.0003 [‐0.0003,0.0010] 3,085,305 0.0191
PDI 8 Postoperative Hemorrhage or Hematoma N 0.0015 [0.0002,0.0028]** 0.0009 [‐0.0005,0.0023] 115,041 0.0014
PDI 9 Postoperative Respiratory Failure N 0.0068 [0.0034,0.0101]*** Y ‐0.0049 [‐0.0075,‐0.0024]*** 94,474 0.0099
PDI 10 Postoperative Sepsis N 0.0056 [0.0009,0.0103]** ‐0.0022 [‐0.0074,0.0030] 89,923 0.0221
PDI 11 Postoperative Wound Dehiscence N 0.0024 [0.0016,0.0033]*** N 0.0022 [0.0014,0.0030]*** 81,672 0.0004
PDI 12 Cent. Venous Catheter‐Related Blood. Infect. Y ‐0.0017 [‐0.0021,‐0.0013]*** Y ‐0.0018 [‐0.0022,‐0.0015]*** 2,397,245 0.0065
PDI 13 Transfusion Reaction 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0000] 0.0000 [‐0.0000,0.0000] 3,085,305 0.0000
PDI 14 Asthma Admission Rate ‐0.0006 [‐0.0024,0.0012] ‐0.0003 [‐0.0022,0.0016] 956,902 0.0126
PDI 15 Diabetes Short‐term Comp. Admissions ‐0.0001 [‐0.0004,0.0001] ‐0.0002 [‐0.0004,0.0001] 245,451 0.0000
PDI 16 Gastroenteritis Admission Rate N 0.0018 [0.0011,0.0026]*** 0.0005 [‐0.0004,0.0015] 1,052,379 0.0053
PDI 17 Perforated Appendix Admission Rate N 0.0117 [0.0043,0.0192]*** ‐0.0004 [‐0.0049,0.0041] 108,432 0.0173
PDI 18 Urinary Tract Admission Rate N 0.0097 [0.0081,0.0113]*** N 0.0010 [0.0005,0.0014]*** 3,085,305 0.0241
NQI 1 Iatrogenic Pneumothorax in Neonates N 0.0003 [0.0000,0.0006]** N 0.0009 [0.0007,0.0011]*** 3,085,305 0.0023
NQI 2 Neonatal Mortality N 0.0060 [0.0038,0.0081]*** N 0.0027 [0.0008,0.0047]*** 3,085,305 0.0320
NQI 3 Neonatal Blood Stream Infection Y ‐0.0594 [‐0.0751,‐0.0437]*** Y ‐0.0150 [‐0.0221,‐0.0079]*** 69,873 0.2609
PSI 17 Birth Trauma ‐ Injury to Neonate N 0.0009 [0.0003,0.0015]*** 0.0004 [‐0.0002,0.0009] 3,085,305 0.0099











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uninsured Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
All States
MA*After ‐0.0231 ‐0.0504 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0202
[‐0.0300,‐0.0162]*** [‐0.0999,‐0.0008]** [‐0.0111,0.0086] [‐0.0397,‐0.0007]**
N (Nonelderly) 23,860,930 23,913,183 23,913,183 23,913,983
Mean MA Before 0.0643 5.4256 1.4267 0.3868
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0791 5.0770 1.3552 0.3591
Mean MA After 0.0352 5.3717 1.4355 0.4058
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0817 5.0958 1.3596 0.3745
Northeast
MA*After ‐0.0160 ‐0.0293 ‐0.0070 ‐0.0293
[‐0.0309,‐0.0011]** [‐0.2007,0.1421] [‐0.0551,0.0411] [‐0.0500,‐0.0085]**
N (Nonelderly) 4,510,280 4,511,992 4,511,992 4,512,094
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0790 5.6529 1.4163 0.4281
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0613 5.6453 1.4203 0.4425
New England
MA*After ‐0.0159 ‐0.0021 0.0170 ‐0.0411
[‐0.0193,‐0.0125]*** [‐0.1276,0.1233] [‐0.0214,0.0554] [‐0.0749,‐0.0072]**
N (Nonelderly) 1,369,181 1,370,420 1,370,420 1,370,438
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0450 5.3462 1.3890 0.3337
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0408 5.3576 1.3840 0.3324
All, No ME, VT, CA
MA*After ‐0.0236 ‐0.0537 ‐0.0022 ‐0.0202
[‐0.0311,‐0.0161]*** [‐0.1082,0.0008]* [‐0.0129,0.0085] [‐0.0417,0.0013]*
N (Nonelderly) 21,067,733 21,119,253 21,119,253 21,119,708
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0837 5.0926 1.3606 0.3653
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0871 5.0996 1.3644 0.3813
25 Most Insured
MA*After ‐0.0246 ‐0.0477 0.0056 ‐0.0066
[‐0.0367,‐0.0126]*** [‐0.0817,‐0.0138]*** [‐0.0012,0.0124] [‐0.0623,0.0491]
N (Nonelderly) 8,028,553 8,057,249 8,057,249 8,057,439
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0595 4.9274 1.3424 0.3300
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0638 4.9342 1.3438 0.3426
Balanced Panel (Only Hospitals That Appear in Data in Every Possible Quarter)
MA*After ‐0.0273 0.1087 0.0297 0.0244
[‐0.0500,‐0.0045]** [‐0.0872,0.3045] [‐0.0038,0.0633]* [‐0.0705,0.1193]
N (Nonelderly) 768,541 770,696 770,696 770,699
Mean MA Before 0.0461 5.4089 1.4104 0.4701
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0714 4.6790 1.3037 0.2769
Mean MA After 0.0279 5.4701 1.4323 0.4902













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uninsured Length of Stay Log Length of Stay Emergency Admit
All Hospitals (100% of sample, including missing ages)
Ma*After ‐0.0153 ‐0.0626 0.0006 ‐0.0367
[‐0.0201,‐0.0104]*** [‐0.1102,‐0.0150]** [‐0.0090,0.0103] [‐0.0585,‐0.0149]***
N (All Ages) 36,282,073 36,343,449 36,343,449 36,345,238
N Hospitals 3,090 3,090 3,090 3,090
N Hospitals in MA 48 48 48 48
Mean MA Before 0.0409 5.8833 1.5099 0.4789
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0543 5.6256 1.4517 0.4291
Mean MA After 0.0226 5.7516 1.5084 0.4912
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0557 5.5819 1.4482 0.4491
Only Hospitals that Appear in Data At Least Once Before Reform
Ma*After ‐0.0152 ‐0.0651 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0369
[‐0.0202,‐0.0102]*** [‐0.1155,‐0.0147]** [‐0.0104,0.0102] [‐0.0596,‐0.0143]***
N (All Ages) 30,390,240 30,441,321 30,441,321 30,442,760
N Hospitals 2,315 2,315 2,315 2,315
N Hospitals in MA 40 40 40 40
Mean MA Before 0.0409 5.8833 1.5099 0.4789
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0543 5.6256 1.4517 0.4291
Mean MA After 0.0230 5.7678 1.5085 0.4856
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0595 5.5803 1.4460 0.4473
Low Uninsured Hospitals
Ma*After ‐0.0178 ‐0.0895 0.0019 ‐0.0409
[‐0.0228,‐0.0129]*** [‐0.1522,‐0.0269]*** [‐0.0074,0.0112] [‐0.0577,‐0.0241]***
N (All Ages) 14,407,631 14,426,624 14,426,624 14,427,194
N Hospitals 1,157 1,157 1,157 1,157
N Hospitals in MA 29 29 29 29
Mean MA Before 0.0303 5.8769 1.5058 0.4431
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0210 5.6142 1.4487 0.4087
Mean MA After 0.0220 5.7938 1.5119 0.4742
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0295 5.6036 1.4438 0.4306
High Uninsured Hospitals
Ma*After ‐0.0165 ‐0.0260 ‐0.0063 ‐0.0086
[‐0.0246,‐0.0085]*** [‐0.0782,0.0263] [‐0.0151,0.0024] [‐0.0312,0.0140]
N (All Ages) 15,982,609 16,015,279 16,015,279 16,016,149
N Hospitals 1,158 1,158 1,158 1,158
N Hospitals in MA 11 11 11 11
Mean MA Before 0.0635 5.8969 1.5186 0.5550
Mean Non‐MA Before 0.0848 5.6360 1.4546 0.4478
Mean MA After 0.0314 5.5593 1.4808 0.5769
Mean Non‐MA After 0.0845 5.5609 1.4478 0.4612
95% asymptotic CI clustered by state: *** Significant at .01, ** Significant at .05, * Significant at .10
MA*During always included but coefficient not always reported.  
All specifications and means weighted using discharge weights.
All specifications include hospital fixed effects and time fixed effects for 2004 to 2008, quarterly.
Low Uninsured Hospitals have less than median uninsurance of 0.0398 before reform.
Sample sizes vary across specifications based on availability of dependent variable.  
Source: HCUP NIS 2004‐2008 authors' calculations.  See text for more details.